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ABSTRACT 
 
Security vulnerabilities pose a serious threat to computer systems and network 
infrastructures. This dissertation addresses the measurement and analysis of security 
vulnerabilities and their impact, as well as the design of several techniques for 
vulnerability mitigation.  
The research starts with the analysis of the security vulnerabilities published in the 
Bugtraq list and CERT advisories. An in-depth analysis of vulnerability reports and the 
corresponding source code of the applications motivates our development of a finite state 
machine (FSM) model to reason about security vulnerabilities. Most attacks can be 
decomposed into a series of violations of simple predicates, which provides a more 
formal way to depict these attacks. Besides the analysis of security vulnerabilities, many 
real-world security attacks are analyzed. The analysis shows that, although most current 
memory-corruption-based attacks compromise system security by overwriting control 
data, a new type of attack, namely non-control-data attack, can also be generally 
applicable to real-world software, e.g., they break into network servers to obtain the root 
privilege. This emphasizes the necessity of further research on defenses against memory-
corruption-based attacks, including control-data attacks and non-control-data attacks. 
The notion of pointer taintedness is introduced as the basis for detecting memory-
corruption-based attacks. A pointer is said to be tainted if its value comes directly or 
indirectly from user input. Pointer taintedness allows the user to arbitrarily specify the 
target memory address to read, write, or transfer control to, which is usually a 
pathological program behavior. On the other hand, the attacker’s ability to taint a pointer 
value is a crucial requirement for most attacks. Based on the notion of pointer taintedness, 
a theorem-proving technique is developed to identify potential security vulnerabilities via 
static source code analysis, and a processor architecture mechanism is implemented for 
dynamic pointer taintedness detection. Evaluations show that the proposed techniques 
offer better security coverage than existing methods: by detecting pointer taintedness, 
both control-data and non-control-data attacks are defeated in a unified manner. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Security vulnerabilities pose a serious threat to computer systems and network 
infrastructures. These vulnerabilities may result from design flaws, configuration errors, 
or implementation errors. Real-world vulnerabilities are due to a wide range of causes. 
Effectively defending against security attacks necessitates an in-depth analysis of 
historical data of known vulnerabilities so as to identify and extract their fundamental 
characteristics. A better understanding of security vulnerability characteristics can guide 
the development of effective defensive techniques applicable to a broad range of real-
world applications. 
This thesis is focused on measurement and analysis of security vulnerabilities; their 
impact and root causes, as well as the development of new design techniques for 
vulnerability mitigation. It specifically addresses three research questions: (1) What are 
the common characteristics of most security vulnerabilities? (2) What are the basic 
assumptions of current defensive techniques and what are the deficiencies of these 
assumptions? (3) How can we build better defensive techniques to overcome the 
deficiencies?  
Analysis and Modeling of Security Vulnerabilities. To study the common 
characteristics of programming errors leading to security vulnerabilities, Bugtraq and 
CERT vulnerability databases are investigated along with the corresponding application 
source code. A finite state machine (FSM) model is developed to depict program states 
during a security attack as a series of primitive operations, each indicating a simple 
predicate that should be guaranteed by the application code. The FSM modeling 
methodology offers a representation approach with a higher degree of formalism in 
reasoning about security vulnerabilities. It is demonstrated that many categories of 
security vulnerabilities, including buffer overflow, format string bugs, heap corruptions, 
integer overflow, input validation errors, and file race conditions can be modeled as 
multi-stage FSMs consisting of logic predicates. The decomposability of most security 
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attacks suggests that attackers can potentially assemble new polymorphic attacks, and 
also that defenders can focus on checking the most common logic predicates to foil 
attacks. These two basic observations motivate the follow-on studies presented in this 
thesis. 
Analysis of the Threat of New Attacks. Most real-world attacks exploit memory 
corruption errors in software to overwrite control data, including function pointers, jump 
pointers, and return addresses. These attacks are known as control-data attacks, which are 
widely understood and typically well documented [62]. Many defensive techniques, such 
as control data protection, non-executable memory pages, and system-call-based 
intrusion detection, have been proposed to defeat control-data attacks. The analysis of 
Bugtraq and CERT shows that many memory corruption vulnerabilities usually allow 
overwriting arbitrary memory locations. This indicates the possibility for non-control-
data attacks as well, i.e., attacks that do not overwrite any control data but still cause 
security compromises, or non-control-data attacks. Although the theoretical possibility of 
non-control-data attacks has been suggested in previous work [24][73][77][83], it is 
generally believed that such attacks are rare against real-world software applications. A 
goal of this thesis is to show the general applicability of non-control-data attacks. Toward 
this end, such attacks are constructed against HTTP, FTP, SSH, and Telnet servers. These 
attacks corrupt configuration data, user identity data, user input strings, and decision-
making flags, which evade the current detection mechanisms. Hence, non-control-data 
attacks represent a realistic security threat to operational software.  
Static and Dynamic Defensive Techniques for Pointer Taintedness Detection. 
Defeating security attacks requires a definition of abnormal program behavior resulting 
from an attack. The notion of pointer taintedness is introduced as the basis to detect 
memory corruption attacks, including control-data attacks and non-control-data attacks. 
A pointer is said to be tainted if its value is derived directly or indirectly from user input. 
Pointer taintedness allows the user to arbitrarily specify the target memory address to 
read, write, or transfer control to, which is usually pathological program behavior. On the 
other hand, the attacker’s ability to taint a pointer value is a crucial requirement for all 
types of memory corruption attacks. Based on the notion of pointer taintedness, a 
theorem-proving technique is proposed to identify potential security vulnerabilities via 
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static source code analysis. A processor-architecture-based solution for dynamic pointer 
taintedness detection is also proposed and implemented on a SimpleScalar processor 
simulator [13]. The implemented algorithm can effectively detect both control-data and 
non-control-data attacks, and therefore provide a more comprehensive detection 
capability than many intrusion detection methods. 
In summary, the contributions of the research are two-fold: (1) demonstration of 
systematic approaches for analyzing and reasoning about system security and (2) design 
of effective and practical defensive techniques. This thesis research spans a broad range 
of security topics, including security vulnerabilities, security threat 
modeling/measurement, formal security properties verification, novel attacks, and 
ultimately defense techniques at processor architecture levels. It is unique because of the 
analysis-centric approach: a significant amount of effort is dedicated to analyzing real-
world security vulnerabilities and uncovering deficiencies in current defensive techniques.  
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CHAPTER 2  
RELATED WORK 
 
The research work presented in this thesis combines three elements:  the study of 
vulnerability data, the study of attacks, and the design of defensive techniques. This 
section provides a literature review for each of these topics individually and discusses 
how previous research projects motivate the workof this thesis. In addition, comparisons 
to the existing literature are made to highlight the uniquess of this work. 
There has been substantial research in modeling, analysis, and classification of 
security problems, some of which is based on real data. Several studies have proposed 
classifications to abstract observed vulnerabilities into easy-to-understand classes. 
Representative examples include Protection Analysis [10], RISOS [1], Landwehr’s 
taxonomy [42], Aslam’s taxonomy [6], and the Bugtraq classification. Similarly, 
taxonomies for intrusions have been proposed. Examples include Lindqvist’s intrusion 
classification [45] and the Microsoft STRIDE model [38]. In addition to providing 
taxonomies, [42] and [45] perform statistical analysis of actual vulnerability data, based 
on the proposed taxonomies. Several studies focus on modeling attacks and intrusions 
with the objective of evaluating various security metrics. Michael and Ghosh [48] employ 
an FSM model constructed using system call traces. By training the model using normal 
traces, the FSM is able to identify abnormal program behaviors and thus detect intrusions. 
In [67], an FSM-based technique to automatically construct attack graphs is described. 
The approach is applied in a networked environment consisting of several users, various 
services, and a number of hosts. A symbolic model checker is used to formally verify the 
system security. Recent studies have proposed stochastic models to quantitatively 
evaluate security metrics. Ortalo et al. [56] develop a Markov model to describe intruder 
behavior and evaluate system security in terms of METF (mean effort to failure). Madan 
[46] describes a semi-Markov model to evaluate an intrusion-tolerant system subject to 
security attacks. Several security and reliability metrics (e.g., METF and availability) are 
defined and shown to be solvable. Clearly, such a model requires that parameters, e.g., 
 5 
probabilities of transitions and sojourn time, be available or estimated. Despite these 
studies on security vulnerabilities, there is little work on modeling of discovered security 
vulnerabilities to capture how and why an implementation fails to achieve the desired 
level of security. The uniqueness of the analysis described in CHAPTER 3 is to use 
actual vulnerability data and code inspection to derive FSMs to describe program 
predicates, which provide a higher degree of formalism in reasoning about real-world 
security vulnerabilities. 
The research on non-control-data attack described in CHAPTER 4 is motivated by a 
number of papers investigating system susceptibilities under hardware transient errors. It 
has been shown that random hardware faults can lead to security compromises in many 
real-world systems. Boneh et al. [12] show that the Chinese Remainder Theorem based 
implementation of the RSA crypto algorithm is vulnerable to any hardware/software 
errors during certain phases of the algorithm. The produced erroneous cipher text allows 
the attacker to derive the RSA private key. In [80], it is observed that even single-bit-flip 
transient errors in critical sections of server programs can cause false authentications. The 
experimental work in [19] shows that bit-flip errors in Linux kernel firewall facilities 
allow malicious packets to survive firewall packet filtering. In [36], Govindavajhala and 
Appel conduct a real physical fault injection experiment with a spotlight bulb heating the 
PC memory chips. The Java language type system can be subverted with high probability 
under this harsh condition. Although the results in the context of random errors may not 
demonstrate imminent security threats, they clearly indicate the high possibility of 
finding attacks other than control hijacking in real-world systems.  Also related are 
papers discussing the possibility of evading system-call-based host IDSs by disguising 
traces of system calls. Mimicry attacks [77][78] cannot be detected by the IDS because 
the malicious code can issue system call sequences that are considered legitimate under 
the IDS model. The attacks proposed in [74] evade IDS detection by changing foreign 
system calls to equivalent system calls used by the original program. It should be noted 
that these mimicry attacks still corrupt program control and thus are defeated by many 
control flow integrity based techniques.  
As for defensive techniques, both static compiler analysis and runtime detection 
techniques have been developed to defeat memory corruption attacks. Generic static 
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techniques such as SPLINT [28] and Extended Static Checking [21] can check whether 
the specified security properties are satisfied in program code. Another family of 
techniques is referred to as type-safety enforcement. Based on the observation that 
memory corruption attacks (including both control-data attacks and non-control-data 
attacks) need to violate the type-safety property, type-safe languages (e.g., Java) and 
several compiler techniques, such as CCured [52], Cyclone [40], and SAFECode [27], are 
designed to achieve type safety through reimplementing software or recompiling legacy 
programs. Despite recent progress, the following facts can affect the demonstratable 
success of these techniques: (1) rebuilding existing software with type-safety property 
requires a tremendous amount of effort and a lot of human knowledge; (2) type-safety of 
an application is usually achieved by hiding type-unsafe behaviors in low-level software 
components, such as Java virtual machine, C library, and OS kernel. Existing attacks 
have also succeeded in exploiting memory bugs in these components. Although 
researchers have started to work on the type-safety in low-level components, 
comprehensively deploying these techniques is a big paradigm shift in programming 
principles. How this shift can be compatible with the real software industry is not yet 
clear. Minimally speaking, making this shift is considered a heavy-weight shift that will 
take a long time.  
Realizing such deployment difficulty, people also propose light-weight defensive 
techniques to provide security without reimplementing or recompiling software. Earlier 
techniques provided protection against specific types of attacks. Representative 
techniques include StackGuard [25] and Libsafe [7] to defeat stack buffer overflow 
attacks, and FormatGuard [23] to defeat format string attacks. Defensive techniques 
which randomize process memory layout to defeat security attacks, are proposed 
[9][57][82]. Although the principle is generic enough to foil most memory corruption 
attacks, there are still barriers in the implementation and deployment, e.g., the 
deployment on hardware architectures with a 32-bit address space has been found to be 
vulnerable to brute-force attacks [65].  
The notion of taintedness was first proposed in the Perl programming language as a 
security feature. Inspired by this, static detection techniques SPLINT [28] and CQUAL 
[66] apply taintedness analysis to guarantee that user input data is never used as the 
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format string argument in printf-like functions. In both tools, taintedness is an attribute 
associated with C program symbols. A symbol becomes tainted only if an explicit C 
statement passes a tainted value to it by assignment, argument passing, or function return. 
For several types of real memory-corruption attacks, pointers are tainted without explicit 
C statements tainting program symbols. Unlike the pointer taintedness analysis approach 
presented here, these techniques do not have a memory model and thus cannot reason 
about the taintedness at the memory level.  
Advances in computer architecture research have resulted in a number of techniques 
that are considered generic against all types of memory corruption attacks. Secure 
Program Execution [73] and Minos [26], which have been proposed most recently, are 
techniques to protect control data integrity. They rely on the definitions of spuriousness 
and integrity of data, which bear certain similarities to taintedness. However, these 
techniques are unable to defeat non-control-data attacks.  
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CHAPTER 3  
MODELING SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
 
3.1. Overview of the Modeling Approach 
Analysis of security vulnerabilities has typically been approached in one of two 
ways: (i) using real data to develop a classification and perform statistical analysis; 
examples include Landwehr’s study on security vulnerabilities [42] and Lindqvist’s study 
on intrusions [45], and (ii) providing a degree of formalism by modeling vulnerabilities 
and attack characteristics; representative work includes Ortalo’s Markov model of UNIX 
vulnerabilities [56] and Sheyner’s attack graph constructor [67].  Our study combines the 
two approaches: real data is analyzed, in conjunction with a focused source-code 
examination, to develop a finite state machine (FSM) model to depict and reason about 
security vulnerabilities. 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of vulnerability reports from typical data 
sources such as CERT [17] and Securityfocus [14]. The analysis shows: 
• Exploits must pass through multiple elementary activities, at any one of 
which it can be foiled. 
• Exploiting a vulnerability involves multiple vulnerable operations on 
multiple objects. 
• Analysis of a given vulnerability along with examination of the 
associated source code allows us to specify the predicates that need to be 
met to ensure security. 
These observations motivate the development of an FSM (Finite State Machine) 
modeling methodology capable of expressing the process of exploitation by decomposing 
it into multiple operations, each of which includes one or more elementary activities. 
Since each elementary activity is simple, it is feasible (using the data and the application 
code) to develop a predicate and a corresponding primitive FSM (pFSM) to represent the 
elementary activity. The pFSMs can then be combined to develop FSM models of 
vulnerable operations and possible exploits.  
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The proposed FSM methodology is exemplified by analyzing several types of 
vulnerabilities reported in the data: stack buffer overflow, integer overflow, heap 
overflow, file race condition, and format string vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities 
include both those that can be exploited remotely (e.g., those impacting Internet servers) 
and those that can be exploited by local users (e.g., privilege escalation of a regular user 
to root). It should be noted that this family of vulnerabilities constitutes 22% of all 
vulnerabilities in the Bugtraq database. For the studied vulnerabilities, three types of 
pFSMs are identified that can be used to analyze operations involved in exploiting 
vulnerabilities and to identify the security checks to be performed at the elementary 
activity level. 
An additional demonstration of the usefulness of the approach was the discovery of a 
new heap overflow vulnerability now published in Bugtraq crediting the authors. The 
discovery was made when modeling another, known vulnerability 
3.2. Analysis of the Bugtraq Database 
3.2.1. Statistical Analysis  
As of November 30, 2002, the Bugtraq database included 5925 reports on software-
related vulnerabilities. Each vulnerability report in this database provides information 
such as version number of the vulnerable software, date of discovery, an assigned 
vulnerability ID, cause of the vulnerability, and possible exploits1. Figure 1 shows the 
breakdown of the 5925 vulnerabilities among the 12 defined classes. Observe that the 
pie-chart is dominated by five categories: input validation errors (23%), boundary 
condition errors (21%), design errors (18%), failure to handle exceptional conditions 
(11%), and access validation errors (10%).  The primary reason for the domination of 
these categories is that they include the most prevalent vulnerabilities, such as buffer 
overflow (included under boundary-condition errors) and format string vulnerabilities 
(included under input-validation errors). The remaining categories, being very broadly 
defined (e.g., access validation errors, design errors), are more or less all-encompassing. 
                                                 
1
 Certain vulnerability reports in Bugtraq include exploits. For example, an exploit associated with vulnerability #5960 is provided in 
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5960/exploit  
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•Access Validation Error: an operation on an object outside its 
access domain.
•Atomicity Error: code terminated with data only partially modified 
as part of a defined operation.
•Boundary Condition Error: an overflow of a static-sized data 
structure: a classic buffer overflow condition.
•Configuration Error: a system utility installed with incorrect setup 
parameters.
•Environment Error: an interaction in a specific environment 
between functionally correct modules. 
•Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions: system failure to handle 
an exceptional condition generated by a functional module, device, 
or user input. 
•Input Validation Error: failure to recognize syntactically incorrect 
input.
•Race Condition Error: an error during a timing window between 
two operations.
•Serialization Error: inadequate or improper serialization of 
operations.
•Design Error and, Origin Validation Error: Not defined.
Configuration 
Error
5%Failure to 
Handle 
Exceptional 
Conditions
11% Environment Error
1%
Atomicity Error
0%
Serialization Error
0% Access 
Validation Error
10%
Unknow n
6%
Origin Validation 
Error
3%
Race Condition 
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Figure 1: Breakdown of Vulnerabilities and Definitions of Vulnerability Categories 
3.2.2. An In-depth Analysis of Vulnerability Reports 
An in-depth analysis of the data and information reported in Bugtraq together with a 
close examination of the associated application code is essential to understanding the root 
causes of the vulnerabilities. By examining the vulnerability reports and the associated 
application source codes, yielded three observations: 
 Observation 1: Exploits must pass through multiple elementary activities – at any 
one of which, one can foil the exploit. The scenario thus can be described as a serial chain 
in which each link (which is model as an elementary activity) provides a security 
checking opportunity: failure at any one elementary activity can foil the exploit. 
This observation can be illustrated using data from three signed integer overflow 
vulnerabilities given in Table 1. Here the analysts have used three different activities as 
reference points to classify the same type of vulnerability into three categories, although 
there is nothing in the data to indicate the specific elementary activity corresponding to 
the observed vulnerability. Thus #3163 has been classified as input validation error, 
#5493 as a boundary condition error, and so on. The existence of three categories for the 
signed integer overflow vulnerabilities suggest that the code executions of the 
corresponding applications contain at least three activities: (1) get an input integer, (2) 
use the integer as the index to an array, and (3) execute a code referred to by a function 
pointer or a return address.  
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Table 1: Example of Ambiguity among Vulnerability Categories 
Vulnerability Description Elementary 
Activity 
Assigned 
Category 
#3163 Sendmail Debugging 
Function Signed Integer 
Overflow* 
A negative input integer 
accepted as an array index 
Get an input integer Input validation 
error 
#5493 FreeBSD System Call 
Signed Integer Buffer Overflow 
A negative value supplied for 
the argument allowing 
exceeding the boundary of an 
array 
Use the integer as 
the index to an 
array 
Boundary 
condition error 
#3958 rsync Signed Array Index 
Remote Code Execution 
A remotely supplied signed 
value used as an array index, 
allowing the corruption of a 
function pointer or a return 
address 
Execute code 
referred by a 
function pointer or 
a return address 
Access 
validation error 
* Each vulnerability reported to Bugtraq is assigned a unique ID, e.g., the report of vulnerability #3163 
can be accessed from http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3163. 
 
Data on buffer overflow vulnerabilities also indicates the existence of at least three 
potentially vulnerable activities: (1) get input string (#6157: interpreted as an input 
validation error), (2) copy the string to a buffer (#5960: interpreted as a boundary 
condition error), and (3) handle data (e.g., return address) following the buffer (#4479: 
interpreted as a failure to handle exceptional conditions). Again, each elementary activity 
provides an opportunity to apply a security check. For example, programmers can either 
check the input length in elementary activity 1, use boundary-checked string functions 
(e.g., getns, strncpy) in elementary activity 2, or deploy return address protection 
techniques, such as StackGuard [25] and split-stack [81], in elementary activity 3. 
Similarly, an analysis of format string vulnerabilities (i.e., user’s input strings 
containing format directives, such as %n, %x, %d) reinforces the validity of our 
observation: format string vulnerabilities are classified as input validation error (e.g., 
#1387 wu-ftpd remote format string stack overwrite vulnerability), access validation 
error (e.g., #2210 splitvt format string vulnerability), or boundary condition error (e.g., 
#2264 icecast print_client() format string vulnerability). Therefore, format string 
vulnerabilities also involve at least three elementary activities. 
Observation 1 forms the basis of our FSM model. As will be seen in Section 3.3, 
each elementary activity can be modeled as a primitive finite state machine (pFSM) 
defined by a predicate which, if violated, results in an exploit. Multiple activities 
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performed on the same object form an operation, which is modeled as a FSM consisting 
of multiple pFSMs in series. 
Observation 2: Exploiting a vulnerability involves multiple vulnerable operations on 
several objects. Let consider again the example #3163 Sendmail debugging function 
signed integer overflow. This vulnerability involves two operations: (a) manipulate the 
input integer (the object of this operation), consisting of elementary activity 1 (get an 
input integer) and elementary activity 2 (use the integer as the index to an array), and (b) 
manipulate the function pointer (the object of this operation), consisting of elementary 
activity 3 (execute a code referred by a function pointer).  
Similarly, the vulnerability #5774 Null HTTPD remote heap overflow vulnerability 
involves three operations performed on three objects: (i) copying the oversized user input 
(the object) to a buffer allocated on a heap memory, which permits overwriting pointers 
following the buffer, (ii) freeing the buffer (the object), which allows writing a user-
specified value to a user-specified location (e.g., function pointer), and (iii) executing the 
malicious code pointed to by the function pointer (the object). Aside from the heap 
overflow and signed integer overflow vulnerabilities shown here, stack buffer overflow 
and format string vulnerability also require multiple vulnerable operations. Thus 
following observation 1, since each operation can have multiple pFSMs, multiple 
operations will then be a chain of such pFSMs. 
Observation 3: For each elementary activity, the vulnerability data and 
corresponding code inspections allow us to define a predicate, which if violated, results 
in a security vulnerability. For example, in the vulnerability #3163 Sendmail debugging 
function signed integer overflow, an integer index x is assumed to be in the range [0,100], 
but the implementation only checks to guarantee that x ≤ 100, hence the problem (the 
vulnerability): allowing x to be a negative index and underflow an array. The correct 
predicate to eliminate this vulnerability would be 0 ≤ x ≤ 100.  
3.3. State Machine Approach to Vulnerability Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to use the above observations to develop an FSM 
characterization of the vulnerable operations. The goal of this FSM is to reason whether 
the implemented operation, or more precisely each elementary activity within the 
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operation, satisfies the derived predicate. To this end, three steps are taken: (1) To 
represent each elementary activity as a primitive FSM (pFSM) expressing a predicate for 
accepting an input object. The predicate is first checked with respect to the specification 
and then with respect to the implementation. (2) To model an operation on an object as a 
series of pFSMs. (3) To cascade the operations to model the vulnerable implementation. 
While the objective here is to reason that a vulnerability (violation of a derived predicate) 
is not present in the implementation, we shall see that the process of this reasoning can 
allow uncovering a previously unknown vulnerability.  
In order to show how a vulnerability can be analyzed using an FSM, consider the 
Sendmail Debugging Function Signed Integer Overflow Vulnerability (#3163). A signed 
integer overflow condition exists in writing the array tTvect[100] in the function 
tTflag() of Sendmail application. As a result, an attacker can overwrite the global 
offset table (GOT) entry2 of the function setuid()3 to be the starting point of attacker-
specified malicious code (Mcode). Two operations are involved in exploiting this 
vulnerability: (1) writing debug level i to array location tTvect[x] (i and x are 
specified by the user) and (2) manipulating the GOT entry of function setuid (represented 
as addr_setuid for convenience in our description). The first operation consists of 
two pFSMs (activities): (i) pFSM1 – get i and x, and (ii) pFSM2 – write i to tTvect[x]. 
The second operation consists of a single pFSM3  – call the function referred by 
addr_setuid. Recall that a pFSM represents a predicate for accepting an input object 
with respect to the specification and implementation. This is explicitly defined as follows: 
Primitive FSM (pFSM). The primitive FSM consists of four transitions and three 
states. The transitions SPEC_ACPT and SPEC_REJ depict the specification predicates of 
accepting and rejecting objects (e.g., a user or a request), respectively. The transition 
IMPL_REJ represents the condition under which the implementation rejects what should 
be rejected according to the specification. This transition depicts the expected or correct 
behavior, i.e., the implementation conforms to the specification. A dotted transition 
IMPL_ACPT represents the condition under which an object that should be rejected 
according to the specification is accepted in an actual implementation. This transition is a 
                                                 
2
 The GOT entry is a function pointer to a specific function. Usually, in position-independent codes, e.g., shared libraries, all absolute 
symbols must be located in the GOT table, leaving the code position-independent. A GOT lookup is performed to decide the callee’s 
entry when a library function is called. 
3
 The published exploit chooses setuid() as the target function of GOT entry corruption, although the targets could be other functions. 
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hidden path representing a vulnerability. Three states are identified: (1) the SPEC check 
state (where an object is checked against the specification), (2) the reject state  – 
transition to reject state indicates that the object is insecure, according to the specification, 
and (3) the accept state  – transition to accept state indicates that the object is 
considered as secure object. See Figure 2. 
Since each elementary activity is simple, it is feasible (using the data and the 
application code) to develop a predicate and a corresponding pFSM. The pFSMs can then 
be easily combined to depict FSM, modeling vulnerable operations and possible exploits. 
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Figure 2: Primitive FSM (pFSM) 
Figure 3 uses the semantic of the primitive FSMs and depicts the complete model of 
the process of exposing the Sendmail Debugging Function Signed Integer Overflow 
Vulnerability. As in a canonical FSM, a label Condition♦Action is associated with each 
transition. (Canonical FSM uses Condition/Action instead of the symbol ♦. Our 
modification is made because some of our examples need the slash symbol to represent 
filenames.) Condition refers to the condition for taking the transition, and Action is the 
action performed by the transition.  
In the example (#3163), in Operation 1, elementary activity 1, the user inputs strings 
str_x and str_i, which are converted to signed integers x and i. The predicate of 
pFSM1 specifies that if str_x represents an integer larger than 231, it should be rejected, 
i.e., pFSM1 reaches the reject state, because signed integer x (4-byte variable) cannot 
correctly represent an integer larger than 231. (The signed integer i can also overflow, 
although it may not cause consequences as severe as an overflow of x). The real 
implementation does not check str_x, i.e., the transition of IMPL_REJ (marked by ?) 
does not exist, and the dotted transition (IMPLE_ACPT) is taken, allowing any str_x to 
arrive at the accept state of pFSM1. At the object accept state, str_x and str_i are 
converted to signed integers x and i, which may become negative integers if overflow 
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occurs. The error exposed in pFSM1 is that the system neglects checking the input 
str_x.  
In Operation 1, pFSM2 depicts the elementary activity write i to tTvect[x]. The 
predicate represented in pFSM2 is the same as in the example in Observation 3, i.e., if an 
integer index x is in the range [0,100], accept the x. However, the implementation 
checks only for the condition x ≤ 100. As a result, negative x can be accepted and used 
in the operation tTvect[x]=i (arrive at termination state ). A potential security 
violation in Operation 1 is that the attacker can overwrite the GOT entry of setuid()  
so that it points to the location of a malicious code Mcode.  Summarizing, Operation 1 
consists of two pFSMs, each offering a security check, each, if provided, can foil an 
attack. 
Operation 2 depicts the manipulation of the GOT entry corresponding to setuid() 
(i.e., addr_setuid).  When Sendmail is started, addr_setuid is loaded to the 
memory. When setuid() is called, the value of  addr_setuid is used as the 
function pointer to setuid(). Following the predicate depicted by pFSM3, the system 
should check whether the value of addr_setuid is unchanged since it was loaded to 
the memory. If this is not the case (i.e., the addr_setuid has been tampered), the 
program should not call to the location indicated by the corrupted addr_setuid. 
However, the corresponding implementation of Sendmail does not perform the check on 
the addr_setuid (IMPL_ACPT=-♦- in pFSM3), and accepts any value of 
addr_setuid. As a result, the program again makes the hidden (dotted) transition and 
the control jumps to the malicious code (Mcode) when setuid() is called. 
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Figure 3: Sendmail Debugging Function Signed Integer Overflow Vulnerability 
 
The FSM model introduces a notation of propagation gate (the triangle between 
FSMs) to depict the causality of the exploitation of the vulnerabilities in the two 
operations. For example, in Figure 3, exploiting operation 1 (overwrite the 
addr_setuid) is the precondition of exploiting operation 2 (execute Mcode), which is 
denoted by the upper propagation gate. The lower propagation gate (denoted as Execute 
MCode) can be the precondition for the exploitation in other operations. 
3.4. Modeling Various Vulnerabilities Using an FSM  
This section provides examples of applying the FSM approach to analyze security 
vulnerabilities. In each case, the predicates related to the elementary activities are 
determined by examining the vulnerability data and the corresponding source code of the 
applications in question.  
3.4.1. Example 1: NULL HTTPD Heap Overflow Vulnerability  
Null HTTPD is a multithreaded web server for Linux and Windows platforms. This 
software was chosen as an example because in the process of constructing the FSM 
model for the known vulnerability of NULL HTTPD, we discovered a new, as yet 
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unknown vulnerability (Bugtraq ID 6255). Discovery of the new heap overflow 
vulnerability demonstrates an additional potential of the FSM-based approach. 
Null HTTPD 0.5 heap overflow is modeled as a series of four pFSMs shown in 
Figure 4a. pFSM1 and pFSM2 depict the buffer manipulation in the function 
ReadPOSTData (the function source code is shown in Figure 4b), which allocates a 
buffer (PostData, source code Line 1) and copies a user specified string from a socket 
(source code Line 4), which is marked as input in Figure 4a. One of the input 
parameters (contentLen) provides the length of input, which, by the specification4, 
should be a non-negative integer. However, Null HTTPD allocates (by calling calloc 
in source code line 1) a buffer for PostData with size 1024+contentLen without 
checking whether contentLen is non-negative. A buffer overflow occurs when the 
attacker provides a negative contentLen (e.g., contentLen = -800) to make 
PostData a buffer with only 224 bytes. This results in buffer overflow (denoted by 
pFSM1) because Null HTTPD always copies at least 1024 bytes arriving from the socket 
to PostData (source code Line 4). 
A New Vulnerability. Version 0.5.1 of Null HTTPD fixed the above overflow 
vulnerability by imposing the appropriate check to block a negative contentLen value 
before calling the function ReadPOSTData (this check is not shown in the source code 
of Figure 4b). Note that the socket programming style requires the users to specify the 
contentLen and input separately, because the socket has no way of determining the 
length of the input. The programmer must ensure that the length of input does not 
exceed the supplied contentLen.  
We now describe how constructing the FSM model for the known vulnerability leads 
to discovery of a new vulnerability for the same operation. pFSM1 depicts the predicate 
to check contentLen against the specification. Similarly, pFSM2 – the predicate to 
check the actual length of the supplied input – should reject input if its length is 
larger than allocated buffer size, i.e., it takes the transition marked “?”. Source code Line 
11 controls the termination condition of recv (source code Line 4). However, due to a 
logic error (|| should be && in source code Line 11), recv never terminates before the 
                                                 
4
 Although a well-defined specification does not exist, this particular specification can easily be deduced from the 
application. 
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entire input string is read from the socket. Thus, the outgoing transition (marked with a 
“?”) from state X does not exist, and instead the hidden transition to the accept state  is 
taken. A malicious user can supply right contentLen but an arbitrary length string 
input to overflow the buffer PostData. Thus, constructing the FSM allowed us to 
uncover this new vulnerability.  
As indicated earlier, each elementary activity offers an independent opportunity for 
checking. If the checks corresponding to the predicates depicted by pFSM1 and pFSM2 
(in Figure 4a) are not in place, the impact of this vulnerability is further analyzed using 
pFSM3, which describes the operation manipulating the heap layout (as shown in the left 
of Figure 4a). The buffer PostData is allocated on the heap, followed by a free memory 
chunk (chunk B). Free chunks are organized as a double-linked-list by GNU-libc. The 
beginning few bytes of each free chunk are used as the forward link (fd) and the 
backward link (bk) of the double-linked list. In this case, since free chunks A, B and C 
are in the list, B->fd=A and B->bk=C. The predicate defined in pFSM3 provides a 
check so that B->fd and B->bk are not overwritten to an arbitrary value (i.e., pFSM3 
does not transit to the reject state), due to the overflow of the buffer PostData 
described in the pFSM1 and pFSM2. However, when the PostData is freed, the actual 
implementation does not check the pointer B->fd and B->bk, causing the transition 
from the reject state to the accept state (the hidden or dotted transition in pFSM3), which 
allows the attacker to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary memory location. 
Specifically, in this example, the attacker exploits this vulnerability and overwrites the 
GOT entry of the function free() so that it points to the location of malicious code 
MCode5. 
 
                                                 
5
 Note that the assignment B->fd->bk=B->bk is executed when PostData is freed. We denote the GOT entry of free() 
as addr_free. The attacker sets B->fd=&addr_free – (offset of the field bk) and B->bk=Mcode, in order to make the 
GOT entry of free() pointing to Mcode. 
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1: PostData = calloc (contentLen +1024, sizeof(char)); x=0; rc=0; 
2: pPostData= PostData; 
3: do { 
4:    rc=recv(sock, pPostData, 1024, 0); 
5:     if (rc==-1) {   
6:           closeconnect(sid,1); 
7:           return;  
8:     } 
9:     pPostData+=rc; 
10:   x+=rc; 
11: } while  ((rc==1024) && (x<contentLen)); 
Figure 4: a) NULL HTTPD Heap Overflow Vulnerabilities   b) Socket Reading Code 
The pFSM4 depicts the consequence of the corruption of the GOT entry of free() 
(i.e., addr_free), which is similar to the scenario depicted by pFSM3 in the Sendmail 
vulnerability shown in Section 3.3. Finally, when the free() is called again, Mcode is 
executed. 
In summary, this model consists of three operations. First operation encompasses 
two activities, each described by an independent pFSM (pFSM1 and pFSM2). Operation 2 
and operation 3 consist of a single pFSM each. Cascading these four pFSMs allows us to 
reason through this entire vulnerable code. 
The purpose of the next set of examples is two-fold: (1) show that FSM approach 
can analyze a broad class of vulnerabilities (specific examples relate to input validation 
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errors, file race condition errors, stack buffer overflow and format string vulnerability), 
and (2) provide additional examples of different types of pFSMs that broadly model the 
studied vulnerabilities. 
3.4.2. Example 2: xterm Log File Race Condition  
The program xterm emulates a terminal under the X11 window system. A file race-
condition6 exists when xterm writes messages to the user log file [8]. Figure 5 illustrates 
two pFSMs required to describe this vulnerability. Consider an example scenario: xterm 
needs to log Tom’s messages to the log file /usr/tom/x. The predicate, which defines 
this operation, is depicted in pFSM1, i.e., if Tom has no write permission or the provided 
filename is a symbolic link, the pFSM should reach the reject state . The real 
implementation follows pFSM1, i.e., the reject condition of the predicate matches the 
implementation, hence this check is secure.  
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Figure 5: xterm Log File Race Condition 
There is however a problem, which is analyzed in pFSM2. In state A, Tom can delete 
the file /usr/tom/x and create a symbolic link from /usr/tom/x to 
/etc/passwd, so long as Tom creates the symbolic link before the system opens the 
file, i.e., a race condition exists. This timing problem is translated into a condition check 
in PFSM2, which depicts the condition that Tom cannot create a symbolic link until the 
open operation is complete. As illustrated in this model, although there is no hidden path 
in pFSM1, i.e., the implementation corresponding to pFSM1 is secure, there is a hidden 
                                                 
6
 File race conditions are also referred as time-of-check-to-time-of-use vulnerabilities. 
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path in pFSM2, indicating the possible race condition and the associated exploit: Tom 
appends his own data to the file /etc/passwd.  
3.4.3. Example 3: Solaris Rwall Arbitrary File Corruption Vulnerability  
Rwall is a UNIX network utility that allows a user to send a message to all users on a 
remote system (see [42] and CA-1994-06 in [17]). The file /etc/utmp on a remote 
system contains a list of all currently logged in users. Rwall daemon on the remote 
system uses the information in /etc/utmp to determine the users to which the message 
will be sent. A malicious user can edit the /etc/utmp file on the target system and add 
the entry “../etc/passwd”. When the malicious user issues the command: rwall 
hostname < newpasswordfile, Rwall daemon writes the message (the 
newpasswordfile) to all terminals and to the file /etc/passwd.   
In Figure 6, pFSM1 checks if a given user has root privileges. The predicate dictates 
accepting the root user and rejecting a regular user (not having root privilege). In the real 
implementation, the write permission of the file /etc/utmp is set on, allowing a 
regular user to write this file (transition to the accept state). Specifically, as denoted by 
the propagation gate, a malicious user can add a “../etc/passwd” entry to the file 
/etc/utmp.  
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-♦ user request of 
writing /etc/utmp root ♦-
-♦-
non-terminal file ♦-
-♦ Get a file from 
/etc/utmp terminal ♦-
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Rwall daemon writes user message 
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-♦ write user message to 
the terminal or file
pFSM2
Operation 1:
Operation 2:
pFSM1
 
Figure 6: Solaris Rwall Arbitrary File Corruption Vulnerability 
The Operation 2 depicts the message write operation performed by the Rwall 
daemon. The daemon gets a filename from the file /etc/utmp. The predicate 
represented by pFSM2 states that if the filename refers to a non-terminal file, e.g., 
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“../etc/passwd”, it should be rejected, and if the filename refers to a terminal, e.g., 
“/dev/pts/25”, the user-specified message should be written to the terminal.  
In the implementation of the Rwall daemon, no file type check is performed. As a 
result, given an entry /etc/passwd added to the /etc/utmp, pFSM2 transits to the 
reject state and ends up in the termination state , which corresponds to a security 
violation – rwall daemon writes user messages to regular file /etc/passwd.  
3.4.4. Example 4: Validation Error in IIS Decoding  
CGI (Common Gateway Interface) programs under the directory 
/wwwroot/scripts are by design executable through HTTP request from a user. 
When IIS7 receives a CGI filename request, it interprets the filepath as a path relative to 
/wwwroot/scripts. Therefore, unless the filepath contains “../”, the target file 
should be under the directory /wwwroot/scripts (Bugtraq ID 2708).  
In Figure 7, pFSM1 depicts the predicate –  if the target file does not reside in the 
directory /wwwroot/scripts, reject the request. Because the path is relative to 
/wwwroot/scripts, the above predicate is equivalent to – if the path of the target file 
does contain “../”, reject the request. The IIS implementation includes two decoding 
steps. As illustrated in the pFSM1, IIS implementation checks the following predicate – if 
the filepath contains “../”after the first decoding, reject the request. However, the 
implementation performs the second decoding step, which results in violating the 
predicate depicted by pFSM1, and allows executing an arbitrary code (not residing in 
/wwwroot/scripts). This inconsistency between the predicate specified by pFSM1 
and the implemented predicate
 
allows a transition from the reject state to accept state (the 
hidden path).  
The attacker can thus supply a malformed filename containing sub-string such as 
“..%252f”. After the second decoding, the string “..%252f” becomes “../”8, which 
allows the execution of arbitrary programs, even those out of the directory 
/wwwroot/scripts. The worm Nimda and its variants actively exploit this 
vulnerability.  
                                                 
7
 IIS is Microsoft Internet Information Service. 
8
 Note that “%25” is decoded to a character “%” and “%2f” is decoded to a character “/”, so “..%252f” becomes 
“..%2f” after the first decoding, and is interpreted as “../” after the second decoding. 
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Figure 7: IIS Decodes Filenames Superfluously after Applying Security Checks 
3.4.5. Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability and Format String 
Vulnerability 
FSM is also used to model a stack buffer overflow vulnerability and a format string 
vulnerability.  
Stack buffer overflow vulnerability (#5960: GHTTPD Log() Function Buffer 
Overflow Vulnerability): Two FSMs are constructed for this vulnerability. The first FSM 
describes a buffer overflow condition in the function log(): a buffer on the stack can be 
overflowed, which allows the return address of log()to be overwritten to the location of 
a malicious code Mcode. The second FSM describes the manipulation of the return 
address of log(): the return address is generated when log() is called, and it is 
consulted when log() returns. The corruption of return address in the first FSM may 
impact the second FSM, resulting in the execution of Mcode.  
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Figure 8: GHTTPD Log() Function Buffer Overflow Vulnerability 
Format string vulnerability (#1480 Multiple Linux Vendor rpc.statd Remote Format 
String Vulnerability): Two FSMs are constructed. The first one describes rpc.statd’s 
failure in checking whether any format directives are embedded in the input string, which 
results in allowing the attacker to corrupt the return address of the function vsyslog() 
to Mcode. The second FSM describes the manipulation of the return address of 
vsyslog(), similar to the above example of #5960. This vulnerability also results in 
execution of Mcode. 
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Figure 9: rpc.statd Remote Format String Vulnerability 
3.5. Common Types of pFSMs  
Examples in the previous sections show that the FSM approach enables a detailed 
modeling/analysis of several types of security vulnerabilities: buffer overflow, race 
condition, signed integer, and format string vulnerabilities (these four account for 22% of 
all vulnerabilities reported in Bugtraq). Vulnerabilities including, access validation 
errors, input validation errors, failure to handle exceptional conditions, can also be 
modeled, if the predicates are derived from available information vulnerability reports, 
exploits descriptions, and application source code.  
As seen in the examples, the operations involving each vulnerability can be modeled 
as a series of pFSMs – each corresponding to an elementary activity. The simplicity of 
the predicates defining the pFSMs makes the generation of the overall FSM relatively 
easy. Since the pFSMs are critical to the analysis – it is meaningful to ask – Are there a 
few pFSMs, which allow us to model the bulk if not all of the studied data? The analysis 
shows that we only require three types of pFSMs to model the full range of studied 
vulnerabilities (i.e., stack buffer overflow, integer overflow, heap overflow, input 
validation vulnerabilities, and format string vulnerabilities). 
Object Type Check. This is a predicate to verify whether the input object is of the 
type that the operation is defined on. In many circumstance, performing an operation on 
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an object of incorrect type results in fail-secure states [46], i.e., the operation fails 
without causing security to be compromised. For example, the object of a ping operation 
should be an IP address or a hostname. It is meaningless to say “ping 
/etc/passwd”, because this will result in an error message “unknown host 
/etc/passwd”. However, as we have seen in the examples, failure in object type check can 
be exploited by attackers, e.g., rwalld (see Figure 6) does not check whether the file 
type is a terminal or a non-terminal file, and Sendmail (see Figure 3) does not check 
whether the input represents an integer or a long integer. 
Content and Attribute Check.  This is a predicate to verify whether the content and 
the attributes of the object meet the security guarantee. Examples of content and attribute 
checks include (1) IIS filename decoding (Figure 7), where the program should verify that 
the request does not contain substring “../”, (2) the system should check whether 
format directives are not embedded in the input, in order to prevent format string 
vulnerabilities (#1480), and (3) GHTTPD (#5960) should check whether the length of the 
input string is less than 200 bytes.  
Reference Consistency Check. This is a predicate to verify whether the binding 
between an object and its reference is preserved from the time when the object is checked 
to the time when the operation is applied on the object. The examples include the return 
address referring to the parent function code, the function pointer referring to a function 
code, and a filename referring to a file. As shown in the FSM models, several conditions 
may result in violating the reference consistency, including stack smashing (#5960), 
signed integer overflow (Figure 3), heap overflow (Figure 4), format string (#1480), and 
file race condition (Figure 5).  
The pFSMs representing the three generic predicates are depicted in Figure 10, 
which shows a typical operation (P) encompassing the three predicates. While all 
predicates may not be involved in all operations, the three suffice to model all the studied 
vulnerabilities classes (stack buffer overflow, integer overflow, heap overflow, input 
validation, and format string vulnerabilities).  
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Figure 10: Types of Generic pFSMs 
 
Table 2: Types of pFSMs 
        Type of pFSM 
 
Vulnerabilities 
Object Type Check Content and Attribute 
Check 
Reference Consistency 
Check 
Sendmail Signed 
Integer Overflow  
pFSM1: Does the input 
represent a long 
integer? 
pFSM2: Is the integer in the 
interval [0 , 100] ? 
pFSM3: Is GOT entry of 
setuid() unchanged? 
NULL HTTPD 
Heap Overflow  
 pFSM1: contentLen ≥0?  
pFSM2 : length(input) ≤ 
size(buffer)  
pFSM3 : Are free-chunk 
links unchanged? 
pFSM4: Is GOT entry of 
free() unchanged? 
Rwall File 
Corruption  
pFSM2 : Is the target 
file a terminal? 
pFSM1: Does the user have 
a root privilege?  
 
IIS Filename 
Decoding 
Vulnerability  
 pFSM1: Does the filename 
contain “../”? 
 
Xterm File Race 
Condtion   
 pFSM1: Does the user have 
a write permission to the 
file? 
pFSM2: Does the 
filename refer to another 
unverified file? 
GHTTPD Buffer 
overflow on Stack  
 pFSM1: size(message) ≤ 
200 ? 
pFSM2: Is the return 
address unchanged? 
rpc.statd format 
string vulnerability  
 pFSM1: Does the filename 
contain format directives 
(e.g., %n, %d)? 
pFSM2: Is the return 
address unchanged? 
In Table 2, the pFSMs of the vulnerabilities analyzed in the previous sections are 
classified according to the three types of pFSMs identified above. The most common 
cause of the analyzed vulnerabilities is an incomplete content and/or attribute check. This 
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can be explained by fact that determining the correctness of an attribute (e.g., a buffer 
size) or a content (e.g., input contains a string “%n”) of a given object may require a 
comprehensive understanding of the application. Incompleteness of a reference 
consistency check is another frequent reason for the vulnerabilities. While techniques 
protecting the return address have been widely recognized, very few techniques are 
available to protect other reference inconsistencies, such as inconsistency of function 
pointers, entries in GOT tables, and links to free memory chunks on the heap. 
3.6. FSM Models Motivating Analysis and Mitigation of 
Attacks 
Code-level FSM modeling is useful in understanding the internals of security 
vulnerabilities and attacks. The insights obtained from the analysis also help in 
identifying deficiencies of many current defensive techniques and formulating security 
predicates upon which to build security protection techniques. Based on the 
understanding of security vulnerability details, CHAPTER 4 presents a thorough analysis 
of real-world security attacks. The analysis shows that a type of attack, referred to as the 
non-control-data attacks, currently considered rare, is generally applicable against many 
real Internet servers. This finding exposes a serious deficiency in many defensive 
approaches. To address this threat, CHAPTER 5 and CHAPTER 6 show that a 
programming flaw, namely pointer taintedness, is a common cause of many 
vulnerabilities. A pointer is tainted when its value can be derived directly or indirectly 
from the user input. Since pointers are internal to applications, they should be transparent 
to users. Thus a tainted pointer is a potential security vulnerability. We will show a 
theorem-proving-based source code analysis and an architectural-level runtime detection 
technique to detect pointer taintedness. 
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CHAPTER 4  
NON-CONTROL-DATA ATTACK: A REALISTIC 
THREAT 
 
4.1. Control-Data Attacks versus Non-Control-Data Attacks 
Most memory corruption attacks shown in CHAPTER 3, and in fact most known 
real attacks, follow a similar pattern known as the control-data attack: they alter the 
target program’s control data (data that are loaded to processor program counter at some 
point of program execution, e.g., return addresses and function pointers) in order to 
execute injected malicious code or out-of-context library code (in particular, return-to-
library attacks). The attacks usually make system calls (e.g., start a shell) with the 
privilege of the victim process. A cursory survey of the CERT/US-CERT security 
advisories [17][75] and the Microsoft Security Bulletin [49] shows that control-data 
attacks are considered to be the most critical security threats.  
Because control data attacks are dominant today, many effective techniques have 
been proposed to defend against them. A reasonable question to ask is whether the 
current dominance of control-data attacks is due to an attacker’s inability to launch non-
control-data attacks9  against real-world software. We think a possible answer is that 
attackers may in general be capable of mounting non-control-data attacks but simply lack 
the incentive to do so because control data attacks are usually easier to construct and 
require little application-specific knowledge. If this is indeed true, when the deployment 
of control flow integrity techniques makes control-data attacks impossible, attackers may 
have the incentives to bypass the defenses via non-control-data attacks.  
It should be emphasized that the target question is not the existence of non-control-
data attacks, but the general applicability of such attacks against real-world applications. 
Their existence has been suggested as a potential threat in previous work 
                                                 
9
 There are other names referring to attacks not altering control flow. For example, Pincus and Baker call them pure 
data exploits [60]. We use the term non-control-data attack mainly to contrast with control-data attack. 
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[24][73][77][83]. However, the applicability of these attacks has not been extensively 
studied.  
This chapter provides experimental evidence to show that non-control-data attacks 
are realistic and can generally target real-world applications. The target applications are 
selected from the leading categories of vulnerable programs reported by CERT  from 
2000 to 2004 [17], including various server implementations for the HTTP, FTP, SSH, 
and Telnet protocols. The demonstrated attacks exploit buffer overflow, heap corruption, 
format string, and integer overflow vulnerabilities. All the non-control-data attacks 
constructed here resulted in security compromises as severe as those due to traditional 
control-data attacks – gaining the privilege of the victim process. Furthermore, the 
diversity of application data being attacked, including configuration data, user identity 
data, user input data, and decision-making data, shows that attack patterns can be 
diversified. 
The experimental results show that attackers can indeed compromise many real-
world applications without breaking their control flow integrity. The results also imply 
that finding a generic and secure solution to defeating memory corruption attacks is still 
an open problem when non-control-data attacks are considered. Many available defensive 
techniques are not designed for such attacks: some address specific types of memory 
vulnerabilities, such as StackGuard [25], Libsafe [7] and FormatGuard [23]; some have 
practical constraints in the secure deployments, such as pointer protection [24] and 
address-space randomization [9][57]; and others rely on control flow integrity for 
security, such as system call based intrusion detection techniques 
[29][30][31][34][32][37][63], control data protection techniques [26][73][54] and non-
executable memory based protections [3][69]. Although compiler techniques such as 
CCured [52], Cyclone [40].and SAFECode [27] are promising and effective ways to 
enforce type safety, migrating existing large legacy code to the safe version is a non-
trivial task. Therefore, it is important to address the realistic threat of non-control-data 
attacks in future research. 
Besides the major contribution of demonstrating the general applicability of non-
control-data attacks, the work in this chapter can also be viewed at a higher level as a step 
toward the empirical evaluation of defensive techniques. With more and more promising 
 31 
defensive techniques being proposed, researchers have started to realize the necessity of 
such an empirical evaluation. In a survey paper [60], Pincus and Baker explicitly call for 
a thorough study on whether current defensive techniques “give sufficient protection in 
practice that exploitation of low-level defects will cease to be a significant elevation of 
privilege threat.”  
4.2. Applicability Claim of Non-Control-Data Attacks 
While control-data attacks are well-studied and widely used, the current 
understanding of non-control-data attacks is limited. Although their existence has been 
suggested for a long time, e.g., Young and McHugh [83] gave an example of such attacks 
in a paper published even before the spread of the notorious Morris Worm10 , the extent 
to which they are applicable to real world applications is not yet known. Because non-
control-data attacks must rely on specific semantics of the target applications (e.g., data 
layout, code structure), their applicability is difficult to estimate without a thorough study 
of real vulnerabilities and the corresponding application source code. Control-data attacks, 
on the other hand, are easily applicable to most real-world applications once the memory 
vulnerabilities are discovered.  
This work is partly motivated by results from a number of research papers 
investigating the impact of random hardware transient errors on system security. Boneh 
et al. [12] show that  hardware faults can subvert an RSA implementation. Our earlier 
papers [19][80] indicate that even memory bit-flips in application can lead to serious 
security compromises in network servers and firewall functionalities. Govindavajhala and 
Appel conduct a physical fault injection experiment to subvert the Java language type 
system [36]. All these security compromises are very specific to application semantics, 
and not due to control hijacking. It should be noted, however, that the security 
compromises caused by hardware faults only suggest potential security threats since 
attackers usually do not have the power to inject physical hardware faults to the target 
systems. Nevertheless, the most compelling message from these papers is that real-world 
                                                 
10
 One of the attack vectors of the Morris Worm overruns a stack buffer in fingerd to corrupt a return address. This 
worm makes control-data attacks widely known to the public. 
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software applications are very likely to contain security-critical non-control data, given 
that even random hardware errors can hit them with a non-negligible probability. 
We realize that several types of memory corruption vulnerabilities, in particular, 
format string vulnerability, heap overflow, signed integer overflow and double free 
vulnerabilities, are essentially memory fault injectors – they allow attackers to overwrite 
arbitrary memory locations within the address space of a vulnerable application. 
Compared to hardware transient errors, software vulnerabilities are more deterministic in 
that they always occur in the programs; and more amendable to attacks in that target 
memory locations can be precisely specified by the attacker. Based on this observation, 
we have the following claim:  
Applicability Claim of Non-Control-Data Attacks: many real-world software 
applications are susceptible to non-control-data attacks, and the severity of the 
resulting security compromises is equivalent to that due to control-data attacks.  
The focus of our study is to empirically validate the applicability claim. Since this is 
a claim about real-world software, the only validation method we can imagine is to select 
a number of representative applications, and try to construct non-control-data attacks. 
Without real experiments, it would be impossible to answer three major questions: (1) 
what data within the target applications are critical to security other than control data, (2) 
do the vulnerabilities exist at appropriate stages of the application execution that can lead 
to eventual security compromises; (3) are the severity of the security compromises 
equivalent to those due to traditional control-data attacks. 
4.3. Security Critical Non-Control Data  
Corruption of application data can usually lead to crash, or incorrect computational 
results. While control data (e.g., return address, function pointers) are targeted by control-
data attack, we are interested in finding non-control data that, if tampered, result in 
security compromises. In the study of several network server applications, we 
experimented with many types of non-control data. The results show that the following 
types of data are critical to application security:  
• Configuration data 
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• User input  
• User identity data 
• Decision-making data 
These classes are not meant to be mutually exclusive or collectively complete, but 
rather, the classification gives an organized reasoning about possibilities of non-control-
data attacks. In this section, we explain each of these data types and why they are critical 
to security. For each data type, we describe the attack scheme(s) in Section 4.4 using real-
world applications.  
It should be noted that identifying security critical non-control data and construct 
corresponding attacks require more sophisticated knowledge about program semantics 
than that for control-data attacks. We currently rely on manual analysis of source code to 
obtain such knowledge. 
Configuration Data. Site-specific configuration files are widely used by many 
applications. For example, many settings of the Apache web server can be configured 
using httpd.conf by the system administrator. The administrator can specify locations of 
data and executable files, access control policies for the files and directories, and other 
security and performance related parameters [5]. Similar files are used by FTP, SSH and 
other network server applications. Usually, the server application processes the 
configuration files to initialize internal data structures at the very beginning of program 
execution. At runtime, these data structures are used to control the behaviors of the 
application, and rarely change once the server enters the service loop. Corrupting 
configuration data structures allows the attacker to change and even control the behaviors 
of the target application. In our study, we have focused on the file path configuration 
information. The file path directives define where certain data and executable files are 
located so that the server can find them at runtime. They also serve as access control 
policies. In the case of a web server, the CGI-BIN path directive is not only used to locate 
the CGI programs, but also prevents a malicious client from invoking arbitrary programs, 
i.e., only a pre-selected list of trusted programs in the specific directory can be executed. 
If the configuration data can be overwritten through memory corruption vulnerabilities, 
an attacker can bypass the access control policy defined by the administrator.  
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User Identity Data. Server applications usually require remote user authentication 
before granting accesses. These privileged applications usually cache user-identity 
information such as user ID, group ID and access rights in memory while executing the 
authentication protocol. The cached information is subsequently used by the server for 
remote access decisions. If the cached information can be overwritten in the window 
from the time when the information is first stored in memory to the time when it is used 
for access control, the attacker can potentially change the identity and perform otherwise 
unauthorized operations within the target system.  
User Input String.  Changing user input is another way to launch a successful non-
control-data attack. Input validation is a critical step in many applications to guarantee 
intended security policies. If user input can be altered after the validation step, an attacker 
would be able to break into a system. We use the following steps in the attack: (1) first, 
use a legitimate input to pass the input validation checking in the application; (2) then, 
alter the buffered input data to become malicious; (3) finally, force the application to use 
the altered data. The attack describe here is actually a type of TOCTTOU (Time of Check 
To Time of Use) attack: using legitimate data to pass the security checkpoint, and then 
forcing the application to use corrupted data that it considers legitimate. TOCTTOU was 
mainly described in the context of file race condition attacks in the existing literature. 
The attack studied here shows that the notion is applicable to memory data corruption as 
well.  
Decision-Making Data. Network server applications usually use multiple steps for 
user authentication. Decision-making routines rely on several Boolean variables 
(conjunction, disjunction, or combination of both) to make the final verdict. No matter 
how many steps are involved in the authentication, eventually at a single point in the 
program control flow, there has to be a conditional branch instruction saying either yes or 
no to the remote client. Although such a critical conditional branch instruction may 
appear in different places in the binary code, each of them makes the critical decision 
based on a single register or memory data value. An attacker can corrupt the values of 
these final decision making data (usually just a one word Boolean variable) to influence 
the eventual critical decision.  
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Other Non-Control Data for Future Investigations. We have discussed four different 
types of data that if corrupted, can compromise security. Many other types of data are 
also critical to program security. We identify some of them for future investigations. File 
descriptors are integers to index the kernel table of opened files. They can point to regular 
disk files, standard input/output, and network sockets. If the attacker can change the file 
descriptors, the security of file system related operations can be compromised. Changing 
a file descriptor to 1 to that of a regular disk file could redirect terminal output to the file 
and result in severe security damages. Another possible target is the RPC (Remote 
Procedure Call) routine number. Each RPC service is registered with an integer as its 
index in the RPC callout link list. The caller invokes a service routine by providing its 
index. Malicious changes of RPC routine numbers could change the program semantics 
without running any external code. 
4.4. Validating the Applicability Claim 
This section validates the applicability claim stated earlier. It would be 
straightforward to manually construct vulnerable code snippets to demonstrate non-
control-data attacks. This, however, does not validate the claim because what we need to 
show is the applicability of such attacks on a variety of real-world software applications. 
Toward this end, we need to first understand what applications are frequent targets of 
attacks and what types of vulnerabilities are exploited. A quick survey is performed on all 
126 CERT security advisories between the year 2000 and 2004. There are 87 memory 
corruption vulnerabilities, including buffer overflow, format string vulnerabilities, 
multiple free and integer overflow. We found that 73 of them are in applications 
providing remote services. Among them, there are 13 HTTP server vulnerabilities (18%), 
7 database service vulnerabilities (10%), 6 remote login service vulnerabilities (8%), 4 
mail service vulnerabilities (5%) and 3 FTP service vulnerabilities (4%). They 
collectively account for nearly half of all the server vulnerabilities.  
Our criteria in selecting vulnerable applications for experimentation are: (1) different 
types of vulnerabilities should be covered; (2) different types of server applications 
should be studied in order to show the general applicability of non-control-data attacks; 
and (3) there should be sufficient details about the vulnerabilities so that we can construct 
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attacks based on them. There are a number of practical constraints and difficulties. A 
significant number of vulnerability reports do not claim with certainty that the 
vulnerabilities are actually exploitable. Among the ones that do, many do not provide 
sufficient details for us to reproduce them. A number of the vulnerabilities that do meet 
our criteria are in proprietary applications. Experimenting with these close-source 
programs is time-consuming given the available manpower in our project. In addition, it 
is not possible to explain the vulnerabilities in source code. Therefore, we have used 
open-source server applications in our work for which both source code and detailed 
information about the vulnerabilities are available.  
The rest of this section presents the experimental results. The demonstrated non-
control-data attacks can be categorized along two dimensions: the type of security critical 
data presented in Section 4.3 and type of memory errors, such as buffer overflow and 
format string vulnerability. Although a significant portion of this section is to illustrate 
various individual non-control-data attacks in substantial details, the high level goal is to 
show that many real-world applications are in general vulnerable to such attacks.  
4.4.1. Format String Attack against User Identity Data 
WU-FTPD is one of the most widely used FTP servers. The Site Exec Command 
Format String Vulnerability [16] is one that can result in malicious code execution with 
root privilege. All the attack programs we obtained from the Internet overwrite return 
addresses or function pointers to execute a remote root shell.  
Our goal is to construct an attack against user identity data that can lead to root 
privilege compromise without injecting any external code. Our first attempt was to find 
data items that if corrupted, could allow the attacker to login to the system as root user 
without providing correct password. We did not succeed in this because the SITE EXEC 
format string vulnerability occurs in a procedure that can only be invoked after a 
successful user login. That means an attacker could not change data that would directly 
compromise the existing authentication steps in FTPD. Our next attempt was to explore 
the possibility of overwriting the information source that is used for authentication. In 
Unix-based systems, user names and user IDs are saved in a file named /etc/passwd, 
which is only writable to a privileged root user. A natural thought is to corrupt 
 37 
information in this file in order to get into the system. By overwriting an entry in this file, 
an attacker can later legitimately login to the victim machine as a privileged user. We 
observed that after a successful user login, the effective UID (EUID) of the FTPD 
process has properly dropped to the user’s UID, so the process runs as an unprivileged 
user. Therefore, /etc/passwd can be overwritten only if we can escalate the privilege 
of the server process to root privilege. This is possible because the real UID of the 
process is still 0 (root UID) even after its EUID is set to be the user’s UID. The success 
of the attack depends on whether we can corrupt certain data structure so that the EUID 
can be reverted to 0. FTPD uses the seteuid() system call to change its EUID when 
necessary. There are 18 seteuid(0) invocations in the WU-FTPD source code, one of 
which appears in function getdatasock() shown in Table 3. The function is invoked 
when a user issues data transfer commands, such as get (download file) and put (upload 
file). It temporarily escalates its privilege to root using seteuid(0) in order to perform 
the setsockopt() operation. It then calls seteuid(pw->pw_uid)  to drop its 
privilege. The data structure pw->pw_uid is a cached copy of the user ID saved on the 
heap. Our attack exploits the format string vulnerability to change pw->pw_uid to 0, 
effectively disabling the server’s ability to privilege dropping after it is escalated. Once 
this is done, the remote attacker can download and upload arbitrary files from/to the 
server as a privileged user. The attack compromises the root privilege of FTPD without 
diverting its control flow to execute malicious code.  
Table 3: Source Code of getdatasock() 
FILE * getdatasock( … ) { 
  ... 
  seteuid(0); 
  setsockopt( ... );     
  ... 
  seteuid(pw->pw_uid); 
  ... 
} 
The attack has been successfully tested on WU-FTPD-2.6.0. We first establish a 
connection to the control port of FTPD, and correctly login as a regular user Alice. FTPD 
sets its effective user ID to that of Alice (e.g., 109). The client then sends a specially 
constructed SITE EXEC command to exploit the format string vulnerability which 
overwrites the pw->pw_uid memory word to 0. The client then establishes the data 
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connection, and issues a get command which invokes function getdatasock(). Due 
to the corruption of pw->pw_uid, the execution of the function sets the EUID of the 
process to 0 permanently. The client can therefore download /etc/passwd from the 
server, add any entry desired, and then upload the file to the attacked server. An entry 
such as “alice:x:0:0::/home/root:/bin/bash” indicates that Alice can login 
to the server as a root user anytime via FTP, SSH or other available service. Figure 11 
gives the state transition and flowchart of the attack. 
FTPD runs as root
Effective UID=0
pw->pw_uid is initialed to Alice’s UID, 
e.g., pw->pw_uid=109. 
The effective UID is set to 109.
ftp target-machine  //connect to the target machine
USER alice //log in as Alice
PASS alice-correct-password
SITE EXEC \x22\x33\x07\x08%.f…%d%n
//This command attempts to overwrite pw->pw_uid to 0 
pw->pw_uid is now 0,
but effective UID is still 109 
FTPD handles the GET command,
which invokes getdatasock. Due to 
the corruption of pw->pw_uid, the 
effective UID is escalated to 0, which 
allows full access to /etc/passwd
PUT passwd //upload the modified /etc/passwd
BYE
Server states Client commands
CD /etc 
GET passwd //get the file /etc/passwd
modify alice’s entry, giving her root UID
alice:x:0:0::/home/root:/bin/bash
Alice has become a user with root 
privilege. 
 
Figure 11: User Identity Data Attack in WU-FTPD 
4.4.2. Heap Corruption Attacks against Configuration Data  
We have found that the memory corruption vulnerabilities on an HTTP daemon and 
a Telnet daemon allow configuration data attacks to succeed in getting root shells, if 
these daemons run as root. Note that some HTTP daemons can run as an unprivileged 
user, e.g., a special user nobody, in which case the root compromise is unlikely to 
accomplish, no matter whether the attack is a control-data attack or a non-control-data 
attack. This fact does not affect our applicability claim stated before, because all we 
claim is that non-control-data attacks can get the same privilege level as control-data 
attacks, which is the privilege level of the victim server. 
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Attacking Null HTTPD. Null HTTPD is a multi-threaded web server on Linux. Two 
heap buffer overflow vulnerabilities have been reported [55]. Available exploit programs 
overwrite a Global Offset Table11 (GOT) entry of a function when the corrupted heap 
buffer is freed. The program control jumps to the attacker’s malicious code when a 
subsequent invocation of the function is made.  
We found that corrupting CGI-BIN configuration string can result in root 
compromise without executing any external code. CGI (Common Gateway Interface) is a 
standard for running executables on the server for data processing. As explain in Section 
4.3, CGI-BIN directive restricts a user from executing programs outside the CGI-BIN 
directory and is thus critical to the security of the HTTP server. A client’s URL 
requesting the execution of a CGI program is always relative to the CGI-BIN 
configuration. Assume that CGI-BIN path of the server www.foo.com is 
/usr/local/httpd/cgi-bin, when a request of URL 
http://www.foo.com/cgi-bin/bar is processed, the HTTP server prefixes the 
CGI-BIN to bar, and executes the file /usr/local/httpd/cgi-bin/bar on the 
server’s file system.  
Our attack is to corrupt the CGI-BIN configuration so that the shell program /bin/sh 
can be started as a CGI program. The heap buffer overflow vulnerability is triggered 
when a special POST command is received by the server. Due to the nature of heap 
corruption vulnerability, an attacker usually can only precisely control the first two 
bytes12 in the corrupted word at a time to avoid segmentation fault. We issue two POST 
commands to precisely overwrite four characters in the CGI-BIN configuration so that it 
is changed from “/usr/local/httpd/cgi-bin\0” to “/bin\0”. After the 
corruption, we can start /bin/sh as a CGI program and send any shell command as the 
standard input to /bin/sh. For example, by issuing rm /tmp/root-private-
file command, we observe that the file /tmp/root-private-file, writable only 
to the root, was removed. This indicates that we are indeed able to run any shell 
command as root, i.e., the attack causes the root compromise. Figure 12 shows the attack 
process. 
                                                 
11
 Global Offset Table (GOT) is a table of function pointers for calling dynamically linked library functions.  
12
 If the value to be written is a valid address, four bytes can be overwritten by a single heap corruption attack. 
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Read CGI-BIN configuration
The configuration is /usr/local/httpd/cgi-bin
CGI-BIN configuration is now /bi, 
without the string terminator ‘\0’
Send the first POST command to the server,
to overwrite 2 bytes of CGI-BIN
Server translates the file name as 
/bin/sh, and run it using the string 
specified by the client as the standard 
input .
/tmp/root-private-file, writable only to 
the root, is removed 
Server states Client commands
Send the second POST command to the server,
to overwrite other 2 bytes of CGI-BIN
CGI-BIN configuration is now /bin, 
with the string terminator ‘\0’
Send the third POST command to run a shell 
command on the server: 
POST /cgi-bin/sh http/1.0↵
Content-Length: 70↵
↵
echo Content-type: text/plain ↵
echo ↵
echo ↵
rm /tmp/root-private-file ↵
↵
This will be the 
standard input 
string to /bin/sh
on the server.
 
Figure 12: Configuration Data Attack against NULL HTTPD 
Attacking NetKit Telnetd. A heap overflow vulnerability exists in many Telnet 
daemons derived from the BSD Telnet daemon, including a default RedHat Linux 
daemon NetKit Telnetd [15][51]. The vulnerability is triggered when function telrcv() 
processes client requests of ‘AYT’ (i.e., Are-You-There) configuration. The attack 
downloaded from Bugtraq overwrites a GOT entry to run a typical malicious code 
starting a root shell.  
When the daemon accepts a connection from a Telnet client, it starts a child process 
to perform user authentication. The file name of the executable for the authentication is 
specified by a configuration string loginprg, whose value can be specified as a 
command line argument. A typical value is /bin/login. Suppose the remote user is 
from attacker.com, function start_login(host) shown in Table 4 starts the 
command /bin/login –h attacker.com –p by making an execv call to 
authenticate the user. The integrity of loginprg is critical to the security. We observe 
that the vulnerable function telrcv() can be invoked after the initializations of 
loginprg and host variables, but before the invocation of start_login(host). 
Therefore, the exploitation of the heap overflow vulnerability allows overwriting 
loginprg value to /bin/sh, and host value to –p, so that the command /bin/sh 
–h –p –p will be executed by function start_login(), giving a root shell to the 
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attacker. Note that if host was not overwritten or it was overwritten to an empty string, 
sh command would generate a File Not Exist error.  
Table 4: Attacking loginprg and host variables in Telnet Daemon 
void start_login(char * host,…) { 
addarg(&argv, loginprg); 
addarg(&arg, ”-h”); 
addarg(&argv, host);  
addarg(&arg, ”-p”); 
execv(loginprg, argv); 
} 
Without the corruption, the execv call is:  
   /bin/login –h attacker.com –p 
 
Due to the corruption, the execv call is: 
   /bin/sh –h –p -p 
 
4.4.3. Stack Buffer Overflow Attack against User Input Data  
Another HTTP server, GHTTPD, has a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in its 
logging function [33]. Unlike the heap corruption, integer overflow or format string 
vulnerabilities, a stack overflow does not allow corrupting arbitrary memory locations, 
but only the memory locations following the unchecked buffer on the stack. The most 
popular method to exploit stack buffer overflow vulnerability is to use the stack-smashing 
method, which overwrites a return address [33]. The attack overwrites the function return 
address saved on stack, and changes it to the address of the injected malicious code, 
which is also saved in the unchecked buffer. When the function returns, it begins to 
execute the injected code. Stack buffer overflow attacks have been extensively studied 
and many runtime protection solutions have been proposed. Most of the techniques try to 
detect corruption of return addresses. We construct an attack that neither injects code nor 
alters the return address. The attack only alters the backup value of a register in the 
function frame of the vulnerable function to compromise the security validation checks 
and eventually cause the root compromise.  
The stack buffer overflow vulnerability is in function log(), where a long user 
input string can overrun a 200-byte stack buffer. A natural way to conduct a non-control-
data attack is to see if any local stack variable can be overwritten. We were not able to 
find any local variable that can be used to compromise its security. Instead, we found that 
three registers from the caller were saved on the stack at the entry of function log() and 
restored before it returns. Register ESI holds the value of the variable ptr of the caller 
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function serveconnection(). Variable ptr is a pointer to the text string of the 
URL requested by the remote client. Function serveconnection() checks if the 
substring “/..” (i.e., the parent directory) is embedded in the requested URL. Without 
the check, a client could execute www.foo.com/cgi-bin/../bar, an executable 
outside the restricted CGI-BIN directory. We observe that function log() is called after 
serveconnection() checks the absence of “/..” in the URL, but before the CGI 
request is parsed and handled. This makes a TOCTTOU (Time of Check To Time of Use) 
attack possible – we first present a legitimate URL without “/..” to bypass the absence 
check, then we change the value of register ESI (value of ptr) to point to a URL 
containing “/..” before the CGI request is processed.  
Table 5: Source Code of servconnection() and log() 
int serveconnection(int sockfd) { 
char *ptr;  // points to the URL  
            // ESI is allocated  
            // to this variable  
... 
1: if (strstr(ptr,”/..”)) 
  reject the request; 
2: log(...); 
3: if (strstr(ptr,”cgi-bin”)) 
4:     Handle CGI request 
... 
} 
Assembly of log(...)  
push %ebp 
mov %esp, %ebp 
push %edi 
push %esi 
push %ebx 
... stack buffer overflow code  
pop %ebx 
pop %esi 
pop %edi 
pop %ebp 
ret 
The attack scheme is given in Figure 13. The default configuration of CGI-BIN of 
GHTTPD is /usr/local/ghttpd/cgi-bin, so the path /cgi-
bin/../../../../bin/sh is effectively the absolute path /bin/sh on the server. We 
use the GET command of the HTTP protocol to trigger the buffer overflow condition and 
force the server to run /bin/sh as a CGI program: we send the command “GET 
AA…AA\xdc\xd7\xff\xbf↵↵/cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh” 13  to the 
server. The server converts the first part of the command, 
“AAA…AAA\xdc\xd7\xff\xbf”, into a null-terminated string pointed to by ptr in 
function serveconnection(). This string passes the “/..” absence check in Line 1 
of serveconnection(). When the string is passed to the log() function in Line 2, 
it overruns the buffer and change the saved copy of register ESI (i.e., ptr) on the stack 
frame of log() to 0xbfffd7dc (i.e., the bytes following “A” characters in the request), 
                                                 
13
 “AA…AA” represents a long string of “A” characters.  
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which is the address of the second part of the GET command “/cgi-
bin/../../../../bin/sh”. When log() returns, the value of ptr points to this 
unchecked string, which is a CGI request containing “/..”. Succeeding in the check of 
Line 3, the request eventually starts the execution of /bin/sh at Line 4 under the root 
privilege.  
Read CGI-BIN configuration
The configuration is /usr/local/ghttpd/cgi-bin
The URL string pointed by ptr is  
AAAAAAAA\xdc\xd7\xff\xbf.
It is a legitimate URL because no 
substring “/..” is present.
Send the GET command to the server,
GET AAAAAAAA\xdc\xd7\xff\xbf↵ ↵ /cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh
The four bytes \xdc\xd7\xff\xbf are 
overwritten to ESI, making ptr pointing to 
0xbfffd7dc, where the string 
/cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh is located.
/bin/sh is started as a CGI program
Server states Client commands
Interact with the root shell running on the server
 
Figure 13: User Input Data Attack in GHTTPD 
 
4.4.4. Integer Overflow Attack against Decision-Making Data  
We also study decision-making data used by security-related operations in server 
applications. These data are usually Boolean variables used to see whether certain criteria 
are met by a remote client. If so, access will be granted. An attacker can exploit security 
vulnerabilities in a program to overwrite such Boolean variables and get access to the 
target system. We study the attack in the context of a secure shell (SSH) server 
implementation.  
An integer overflow vulnerability [70] exists in multiple SSH server 
implementations, including one from SSH Communications Inc. and one from 
OpenSSH.org. The vulnerability is triggered when an extraordinarily large encrypted 
SSH packet is sent to the server. The server copies a 32-bit integer packet size value to a 
16-bit integer. The 16 bit integer can be set to zero when the packet is large enough. Due 
to this condition, an arbitrary memory location can be overwritten by the attacker. 
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Available exploitation online changes a function return address to run malicious shell 
code [70]. Detailed descriptions and analyses of this vulnerability can be found in [58] 
and [72]. 
Our goal is to corrupt non-control data in order to login to the system as root without 
providing a correct password. We study the source code of the SSH server 
implementation from SSH Communications Inc. The integer overflow vulnerability is in 
function detect_attack(), which detects the CRC32 compensation attack against 
the SSH1 protocol. This function is invoked whenever an encrypted packet arrives, 
including the encrypted user password packet. The SSH server relies on function 
do_authentication() (shown in Table 6) to authenticate remote users. It uses a 
while loop (line 2) to authenticate a user based on various authentication mechanisms, 
including Kerberos and password. The authentication succeeds if it passes any one of the 
mechanisms. A stack variable authenticated is defined as a Boolean flag to indicate 
whether the user has passed one of the mechanisms. The initial value of authenticated is 
0 (i.e., false). Line 3 reads input packet using packet_read(), which internally 
invokes the vulnerable function detect_attack().  Our attack is to corrupt the 
authenticated flag and force the program to break out of the while loop and go to 
line 9, where a shell is started for the authenticated user. 
Table 6: Source Code of do_authentication() 
void do_authentication(char *user, ...) 
{ 
1:  int authenticated = 0; 
... 
2:  while (!authenticated) { 
   /* Get a packet from the client */ 
3:    type = packet_read();  
      // calls detect_attack() 
internally 
4:    switch (type) { 
   ... 
5:    case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: 
6:     if (auth_password(user, 
password)) 
7:          authenticated =1; 
      case ... 
   } 
8:    if (authenticated) break; 
 } 
 /* Perform session preparation. */ 
9:  do_authenticated(pw); 
} 
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Our attack tries to login as root without providing a correct password: when the 
server is ready to accept the root password, the SSH client sends a very large packet to 
the receiving function packet_read() (Line 3). The packet is specially formulated to 
trigger the integer overflow vulnerability when packet_read() calls 
detect_attack() for detection. As a result, the authenticated flag is changed 
to non-zero. Although the server does fail in function auth_password() (Line 6), it 
breaks out of the while loop and proceeds to create a shell for the client (Line 9). The 
client program successfully gets into the system without providing any password. Figure 
14 shows the status of both the client and the server during the attack.  
Currently our attack program has not calculated the correct checksum of the 
malicious packet that we sent to the server, so the packet would be rejected by the 
checksum validation code in the SSH server. For a proof-of-concept attack, we 
deliberately make the server accept the malicious packet without validating its checksum. 
To make the attack complete, we need to understand the DES cryptographic algorithms to 
recalculate the checksum. Note that an attack including the checksum calculation 
algorithm is publicly available [72]. Other than this peculiarity, we have confirmed that 
the vulnerability allows precise corruption of authenticated flag, and that this 
corruption is sufficient to grant the root privilege to the attacker.   
Call do_authenticated() to start a root 
shell
Start do_authentication()
authenticated is 0
Ask for root password
Start the modified SSH client by
ssh –v –l root TARGET_SSH_SERVER
authenticated flag is now non-zero.
Although SSH server fails in password 
authentication, the attacker still gets in 
because authenticated is non-zero.
Server states Client commands
Send a malicious packet as the password.
This packet overwrites the authenticated 
flag to non-zero.
 
Figure 14: Attacking Stack Variable authenticated in SSH Server 
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4.5. Implications on Defensive Techniques 
The success in constructing non-control-data attacks for various network server 
applications suggest a re-examination of many current defensive techniques, which can 
be broadly categorized into two classes:  techniques to avoid having memory-safety bugs 
in software and techniques to defeat exploitations of these bugs. We discuss these 
techniques below and the impact of our result on them. 
4.5.1. System Call Based Intrusion Detection Techniques 
Many host-based instruction detection systems (IDS) monitor the behaviors of an 
application process at system call level. These systems build abstract models of a 
program based on system call traces. At runtime, the IDS monitor the system calls issued 
by the program. Any deviation from the pre-built abstract model is considered abnormal 
or incorrect behavior of a program. One of the earliest attempts was by Forrest et. al. [31] 
[37] in which they used short sequences of system calls (N-grams) obtained from training 
data to define a process’s correct behavior. The monitoring is a matter of sequence 
matching against the pre-built N-gram database. Wagner and Dean [77] build abstract 
system call models from the control flow graph based on static source code analysis. A 
basic non-deterministic finite automaton (NDFA) and a more powerful non-deterministic 
pushdown automaton (NPDA) that incorporates stack state are built. Sekar et al. [63] 
improves Forrest’s training method. They built a finite state automaton (FSA) constructed 
from training system traces by associating system calls with program counter information. 
Feng et. al. [29] further improves the training method in the VtPath model. At every 
system call, VtPath extracts the virtual stack list, which is the list of return addresses of 
functions in the call stack. Then a virtual path is extracted from two consecutive virtual 
stack lists and stored as a string in a hash table. VtPath detects some attacks that are 
missed by the FSA model. In a follow-up paper, Feng et. al. [30] proposed a static 
version of VtPath, called VPStatic, and compared to the DYCK by Griffin et. al. [34] 
which constructs PDA models directly from binary code. Gao et al. [32] proposes the 
execution graph model that uses training system call traces to approximate the control 
flow graph that is usually only available through static code analysis. The execution 
graph is built by considering both program counter and call stack information.  
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All these intrusion detection methods monitor process behaviors at the system-call 
level, that is, they are only triggered upon system calls. As shown earlier, non-control-
data attacks require no invocation of system call, therefore the attacks will most likely 
evade the detection of the system-call based monitoring mechanisms. Data flow 
information needs to be incorporated in these IDS models in order to detect non-control-
data attacks.  
Some IDS techniques [41] abstract program normal behaviors using statistical 
distributions of system call parameters. The distribution is obtained from training data. At 
runtime, the IDS detects program anomalies by observing deviation from the training 
model. These methods detect intrusions based on the anomalies of data rather than the 
anomalies in control flow. Therefore, we believe that with proper training, they can detect 
some of the non-control-data attacks: the HTTPD CGI-BIN attack when /bin/sh is run by 
the execve() since that is most likely not in the training model. The method, however, is 
not able to detect the decision-making data attack in Section 4.4.4 where no system call 
parameter is modified; it cannot detect the user-identity data attack discussed in Section 
4.4.1 without considering control flow information in the training model. It might be 
difficult for a statistical algorithm to precisely extract a fine-grained policy to detect the 
attacks with a reasonably low false positive rate. Despite such technical difficulties, 
considering system call parameter anomalies is one possible way to extend current IDS’s 
in detecting some non-control-data attacks. 
4.5.2. Control Data Protection Techniques 
Corrupting control data to alter the control flow is a critical step in traditional attacks. 
Compiler techniques and processor architecture level techniques have been proposed in 
very recent papers to protect control data. DIRA is a compiler to automatically insert 
code only to check the integrity of control data [68]. An explicitly stated justification of 
this technique is that control flow diversion attacks are currently considered the most 
dominant attacks. Suh, Lee and Devadas developed the Secure Program Execution 
technique to defeat memory corruption attacks [73]. The idea is to tag the data directly or 
indirectly derived from I/O as spurious data, which a concept more commonly referred to 
as tainted data in other literatures [28][59][66]. Security attacks are detected when tainted 
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data is used as an instruction or jump target addresses. Another recent work on control 
data protection is Minos [26], which extends each memory word with an integrity bit. 
Integrity indicates whether the data originating from a trusted source. It is essentially the 
negation of taintedness. Very similar to Secure Program Execution, Minos detects attacks 
when the integrity bit of a control data is 0.  
We agree that control data are highly critical in security-related applications. Not 
protecting them allows attacks to easily succeed. While the authors of the above 
defensive techniques assume that protecting control data integrity can defeat most attacks 
exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities, this assumption may be unsafe when the 
general applicability of non-control-data attacks is considered.       
4.5.3. Non-Executable Memory Based Protections 
A number of defensive techniques are based on non-executable memory pages, 
which block the attackers’ attempt to inject malicious code onto a writable memory page 
and later divert program control to execute the injected code. StackPatch is a Linux patch 
to disallow executing code on the stack [69]. Microsoft has also implemented non-
executable memory page supports in Windows XP Service Pack 2 [3]. In addition, the 
latest versions of Linux and OpenBSD are enhanced with similar protections.  
These defensive techniques cannot defeat non-control-data attacks, because there is 
no attempt to run any injected code during the attacks. Note that non-executable memory 
based protections can also be defeated by the return-to-library attacks, which divert 
program control to library code, instead of the injected code [79]. 
4.5.4. Memory Safety Enforcement 
CCured [52] is a program transformation tool that attempts to statically verify that a 
C program is type-safe, and thus free from memory errors. When static analysis is 
insufficient to prove type-safety, it instruments vulnerable portions of code with checks 
to avoid errors such as NULL pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds memory accesses, and 
unsafe type casts. Its main mechanism for enforcing memory safety is a type-inference 
algorithm that distinguishes pointers by how safely they are used. Based on this 
classification of pointers, code transformations are applied to include appropriate runtime 
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checks for each type of pointer. Although CCured’s analysis techniques and runtime 
system are sophisticated and guarantee memory safety, instrumenting existing programs 
often require nontrivial source code changes to ensure compatibility with external 
libraries. 
CRED [61] is a buffer overflow detector that uses the notion of referent objects to add 
bounds checking to C without restricting safe pointer. Any addresses resulting from 
arithmetic on a pointer must lie within the same memory object as that of the pointer. To 
enforce this, CRED stores the base address and size of all memory objects in the object 
table. Immediately before an in-bounds pointer is used in an arithmetic operation, its 
referent object’s bounds data is retrieved from the object table. This data is used to ensure 
the pointer arithmetic’s result lies within the bounds of the referent object. When an out-
of-bounds address is used in pointer arithmetic, its associated referent object’s bounds 
data is used to determine if the resulting address is in bounds. To reduce performance 
overhead, CRED limits its bounds checking to string buffers, which implies that CRED 
does not provide protection against attacks involving non-string buffers. In addition, 
programs that perform heavy string-processing (e.g., web/email servers) can still incur 
overheads as high as 200%. 
Cyclone [40] is a memory-safe dialect of C that aims to maintain much of C’s flexible, 
low-level nature. It ensures safety in C by imposing a number of restrictions. Like 
CCured, Cyclone adds several pointer types that indicate how a pointer is used and 
inserts appropriate runtime checks based on a pointer’s type. Porting C programs to 
Cyclone, however, can be difficult due to its additional restrictions and semantics. For 
example, Cyclone only infers pointer kinds for strings and arrays. As such, it is often the 
programmer’s responsibility to determine the appropriate type for a pointer. This task can 
be very time-consuming for large programs that make extensive use of pointers. In 
addition, Cyclone programs often perform significantly worse than their C counterparts 
and commonly-used software development tools such as compilers and debuggers must 
be modified for use with Cyclone source code. 
SAFECode [27] is a compiler technique with the ultimate goal of enabling 100% 
static memory-safety enforcement for programs running on embedded systems. The key 
technique is an automatic pool allocation algorithm. Although SAFECode does impose 
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certain language restrictions on C programs, it has been tested against a diverse set of 
embedded C programs. Because it is a static compiler analysis technique, it does not 
incur the runtime overhead as CCured and Cyclone.  
Although the techniques enforcing memory-safety continue to show great promise, 
the software engineering community has not established techniques that allow an easy 
migration path from current large code bases, and thus memory-safety bugs are likely to 
still exist for an extended period of time. For this reason, research efforts should still be 
invested in defensive techniques that assume the existence of memory-safety bugs. 
4.5.5. Other Defensive Techniques 
We now discuss other runtime defensive techniques which do not assume the 
control-data attack pattern.  
Specialized techniques of which the effectiveness is not affected by non-control-data 
attacks. Some specialized dynamic detection techniques are not affected by non-control-
data attacks: StackGuard [25] and Libsafe [7] can still defeat many stack buffer overflow 
attacks unless security sensitive data are in the same frame as the overflowing buffer, like 
the one in GHTTPD example. FormatGuard [23] is still effective to defeat format string 
attacks because it does not allow overwriting arbitrary memory addresses. However, 
these techniques are not generic enough to defeat attacks exploiting other types of 
vulnerabilities. 
Generic techniques requiring improvements. Among various techniques that address 
a broader range of memory vulnerabilities, the underlying principles of the pointer 
protection technique PointGuard [24], address-space randomization techniques [9][57] 
and TaintCheck [54] are sound, but improvements are needed to better deploy these 
principles: 
PointGuard is a compiler technique that embeds pointer encryption/decryption code 
to protect pointer integrity in order to defeat most memory corruption attacks. In principle, 
if all pointer, including pointers in application code and in libraries (e.g., LibC), are 
encrypted, most memory corruption attacks can be defeated. However, without the 
instrumented library code, the current PointGuard cannot defeat many non-control-data 
attacks. For example, the previous presented heap overflow and format string attacks only 
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corrupt heap free-chunk pointers and the argument pointers of printf-like functions, 
which are pointers in LibC. Although there are technical challenges in the 
instrumentation of PointGuard at the library level, such as the lack of accurate type 
information, we argue that such an improvement is essential. 
The principle of address-space randomization techniques is to rearrange memory 
layout so that the actual addresses of program data are different in each execution of the 
program. Ideally, the addresses should be completely unpredictable. Nevertheless, 
Shacham et al. [65] has recently shown that most current randomization implementations 
on 32-bit architectures suffer from the low entropy problem – even with very aggressive 
re-randomization measures, these techniques cannot provide more than 16-20 bits of 
entropy, which is not sufficient to defeat determined intruders. Deploying address-space 
randomization techniques on 64-bit machines is considered more secure.  
TaintCheck [54] uses a software emulator to track the taintedness of application data. 
Depending on its configuration and policies, TaintCheck can perform checks on a variety 
of program behaviors, e.g., use of tainted data as jump target, use of tainted data as 
format string, and use of tainted data as system call arguments. Preventing the use of 
tainted data as system call arguments can be used to detect some, but not all non-control-
data attacks. However, as the authors of TaintCheck have pointed out, this can lead to 
false positives as some applications do require legitimately embedding tainted data in the 
system call arguments. Further, the reported runtime slowdown is between 5-37 times. 
Further research is required to address the issues of security coverage, false positive rate 
and runtime overhead.  
4.5.6. Defeating Memory Corruption Attacks: Still Challenging in 
Practice 
The above analysis shows that finding a generic and secure runtime technique to 
defeat memory corruption attacks is still an open problem. The specialized techniques 
can only defeat attacks exploiting a subset of memory vulnerabilities. For generic 
defensive techniques, many of them provide security by enforcing control flow integrity, 
and thus the security coverage is incomplete due to the general applicability of non-
control-data attacks. A few other generic solutions, although not fundamentally relying 
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on control flow integrity, need improvements to overcome the practical constraints in 
their deployments.  
4.6. Empirical Discussions on Mitigating Factors  
Despite the general applicability of non-control-data attacks, we did experience more 
difficulties when constructing these attacks as compared to constructing control-data 
attacks. In particular, the requirement of application-specific semantic knowledge and the 
lifetime of security critical data are major mitigating factors that impose such difficulties 
on attackers.  
4.6.1. Requirement of Application-Specific Semantic Knowledge 
An obvious constraint for constructing non-control-data attacks is attakcers’ reliance 
on application-specific knowledge. In a control-data attack, as long as a function pointer 
or a return address can be overwritten, a generic piece of shell code will be started to do 
all kinds of security damages easily. However, a non-control-data attack must preserve 
control flow integrity, so an attacker needs to have in-depth knowledge about how the 
target application behaves. For example, to attack HTTP servers, we need the insights 
into the CGI mechanism; to attack WU-FTP server, we should know how the effective 
UID is elevated and dropped. In the current stage, we have not formulated an automatic 
method to obtain such knowledge. The method that we used in attack constructions is a 
combination of vulnerability report review, debugger-aided source code review and 
certain diagnostic tools such as strace (system call tracer) and ltrace (library call tracer). 
This is apparently a time-consuming process.  
However, we argue that this is not a fundamental constraint on attackers because, 1) 
knowledge of widely used applications is not hard to obtain, so a determined attacker is 
likely to eventually succeed no matter how long it takes, if there is a strong incentive; 2) 
Although we spent lots of effort to construct these attacks, future attackers may not need 
the same amount of effort. For example, suppose a new vulnerability was found in 
another HTTP server, an attacker would easily think of attacking CGI-BIN configuration. 
This can be similar to the history of the stack-smashing attack – it was a mystery when 
the Morris Worm spread, but is now straightforward to understand.  
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4.6.2. Lifetime of Security Critical Data 
Lifetime of security critical data is another constraint on seeking non-control-data 
attacks. The lifetime of a value is defined as the interval from the time when the value is 
stored in a variable to the time of its last reference before the variable is de-allocated or 
reassigned. Only when a vulnerability is exploitable during the lifetime of some security 
critical data can an attack succeed.  
Our experience shows that although there are many potential data critical to security, 
a majority of them are eliminated by the constraints of value lifetime – the vulnerability 
occurs either before the data value is initialized or after the semantically diverging 
operation is performed. Therefore, reducing the lifetime should be considered as a secure 
programming practice. Two of the discussed attacks would not succeed if the programs 
were slightly changed as shown in Table 7. The original WU-FTPD function 
getdatasock() uses the global data pw->pw_uid in the seteuid call, allowing 
any vulnerability occurring before getdatasock() to escalate the process privilege. If 
the function was written as (A2), where a short-living local variable is used, only a 
vulnerability occurring within the lifetime of tmp (denoted as an arrow) could affect the 
seteuid call. Similarly, in the original SSHD do_authentication() (code B1), 
the lifetime of the authenticated value covers the vulnerable packet_read() 
call. By inserting the statement “authenticated=0” after Line L1 in code B2, 
authenticated flag is always refreshed in every iteration, and thus its lifetime 
becomes shorter. The attack could not succeed since the vulnerability in L1 was out of 
the lifetime of authenticated flag.  
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Table 7: Reducing Data Lifetime for Security 
 
(A1) Original WU-FTPD getdatasock() 
{ seteuid(0); 
  setsockopt( ... );     
  seteuid(pw->pw_uid); 
} 
 
(A2) Modified WU-FTPD getdatasock() 
{ tmp = geteuid(); 
  seteuid(0); 
  setsockopt( ... );      
  seteuid(tmp); 
 } 
 
(B1)Original SSHD do_authentication() 
{ int authenticated = 0; 
  while (!authenticated) { 
L1:type = packet_read(); //vulnerable 
   switch (type) { 
    case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: 
     if (auth_password(user, passwd)) 
          authenticated = 1; 
    case ... 
   } 
   if (authenticated) break; 
  } 
  do_authenticated(pw);   
} 
 
 
(B2)Modified SSHD do_authentication() 
{ int authenticated = 0; 
  while (!authenticated) { 
L1:type = packet_read(); //vulnerable 
   authenticated = 0; 
   switch (type) { 
    case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: 
     if (auth_password(user, passwd)) 
          authenticated = 1; 
    case ... 
   } 
   if (authenticated) break; 
  } 
  do_authenticated(pw);   
} 
The lifetimes of security critical configuration data, as those in the NULL HTTPD 
attack and the Telnetd attack, are more difficult to reduce. A possible protection solution 
is to encrypt them in a similar way as the encryption technique used by PointGuard or to 
set the memory of configuration data read-only. 
4.7. Summary of Non-Control-Data Attack Applicability 
We begin with the applicability claim that many real-world software applications 
are susceptible to attacks that do not hijack program control flow, and the severity of the 
resulting security compromises is equivalent to that due to control-data attacks. The 
claim is empirically validated by the experiments on constructing non-control-data 
attacks against many major network server applications. Each attack exploits a different 
type of memory vulnerability to corrupt non-control data and obtain the privilege of the 
victim process. The results of the experiments indicate that control flow integrity may not 
be a sufficiently accurate approximation to software security. The general applicability of 
non-control-data attacks represents a realistic threat to be considered seriously in defense 
research.  
We study a wide range of current defensive techniques and discuss how the general 
applicability of non-control-data attacks affects the effectiveness of these techniques. The 
analysis shows the necessity for further research on defenses against memory corruption 
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based attacks. Finding a generic and secure solution to defeat memory corruption attacks 
is still an open problem. 
Despite their general applicability, non-control-data attacks are less straightforward 
to construct compared to control-data attacks because they require insight semantic 
knowledge about the target application. Another important constraint is the lifetime of 
security-critical data. We suggest that reducing data lifetime is a secure programming 
practice that will increase software resilience to attacks. 
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CHAPTER 5  
REASONING ABOUT VULNERABILITIES USING 
POINTER TAINTEDNESS SEMANTICS 
 
5.1. Pointer Taintedness 
The FSM analysis work presented in CHAPTER 3 and the study of non-control-
data attacks presented in CHAPTER 4 prompt us to seek defensive technique providing 
better security protection coverage via identifying a root cause of most memory 
corruption attacks. The FSMs of stack buffer overflow, heap corruption, integer overflow 
and format string vulnerability presented earlier suggest the existence of a common root 
cause – pointer taintedness, which refers to the program behavior that during the 
execution of a program, a pointer value (including return address) is derived directly or 
indirectly from user input. Since pointers are internal to applications, they should be 
transparent to users. Thus a taintable pointer suggests a potential security vulnerability.  
In order to support the claim that pointer taintedness is indeed the root cause of a 
wide range of real vulnerabilities, this section gives detailed illustrations about the 
internals of format string vulnerability, heap corruption vulnerability, stack buffer 
overflow and globbing vulnerability. We then propose a theorem-proving based source 
code analysis technique to reason about these security vulnerabilities based on the notion 
of pointer taintedness. 
5.1.1. Format String Vulnerability 
Format string vulnerability is caused by incorrect invocation of printf-like 
functions (e.g., printf, sprintf, snprintf, fprintf and syslog). Table 
8 gives examples of correct and incorrect invocations of Printf() (our simplified 
version of LibC printf() that we developed). This sample program produces five 
lines of output (shown in Table 8). Output lines O1 and O2 result from executing line L3 
of the code: the string buf hosting “hello”, and the integer i has the value 1234. In 
addition, line L3 uses the format directive %n to write the character count (i.e., the 
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number of characters printed up to that point) into the address of the corresponding 
integer variable. In this case, the length of “string=hello↵data=1234↵” is 23, so 
Printf() writes 23 to the integer j. This value is printed out in line O3 of the program 
output. The format string vulnerability is caused by incorrect invocation of Printf in 
line L4, which directly uses buf as the format string (the proper usage should be 
Printf(“%s”, buf)). 
This vulnerability is usually exploited in the following manner. Let’s assume that 
the attacker wants to corrupt an arbitrary memory location (e.g., the global integer i).  In 
order to do this, he/she constructs an input string buf as given below (observe that the 
beginning of the input string corresponds to the address of global integer i): 
\x78 \x99 \x04 \x08 %d %d %d ‘1’ ‘2’ ‘3’ ‘4’ ‘5’ %n  
The string is read by scanf() and passed to Printf(), which in turn, calls 
Vfprintf(). Just before Line L1 is executed, the stack layout is like the one in Figure 
15. In Vfprintf(), there are two pointers: p is the pointer to sweep over the format 
string buf (from “\x78” to”%n”), and ap is the pointer to sweep over the arguments 
(starting from the 12-byte gap). The attacker deliberately embeds three “%d” directives in 
buf so that ap can consume the 12-byte gap and get to the word 0x08049978. A 
padding string “12345” follows the “%d” directives in order to adjust the character count. 
As we see in the program output line O4, the words in the 12-byte gap are printed as 
three integers followed by a padding string “12345”. Eventually, when p arrives at the 
position of “%n” (i.e., the code line L1 is about to be executed), ap happens to arrive at 
the position of 0x08049978. Line L1 writes the character count count to the location 
pointed by *ap. In this case, since the content in the location pointed by *ap is the 
address of the integer i, the character count 31 is written to i. Note that this attack can 
overwrite any memory location, including locations containing return addresses or the 
global offset table of an application, which can result in the execution of the attacker’s 
code. 
 58 
Table 8: Format String Vulnerability Illustration 
   int Vfprintf (FILE *s, const char *format, va_list ap) 
   {      char * p;    
         int count; 
           p = format; … … 
L1:     *(int *) ap = count; 
           … …  
   }  
 
   int Printf (const char *format, ...) 
   {   va_list arg;     … …  
L2:    Vfprintf (stdout, format, arg); 
      … … 
   } 
 
   int i,j; 
   int main() 
   {  char buf[100]; 
      //This is how to call Printf correctly 
      strcpy(buf,"hello"); 
      i=1234; 
L3:   Printf("string=%s\ndata=%d\n%n",buf,i,&j); 
      Printf("total output length=%d\n",j);  
 
       //This is how format string vulnerability occurs 
      scanf(“%s”,buf); 
 L4:  Printf(buf); 
 L5:  Printf("\ni=%d\n",i); 
   } 
 
Program Output: 
O1:         string=hello 
O2:         data=1234 
O3:         total output length=23 
O4:             134514747123413451916812345 
O5:         i=31 
… …
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Figure 15: How to Overwrite the Global Integer i 
We can view the above vulnerability as a consequence of pointer taintedness. In the 
above code (Table 8), the string buf is obtained from user input and is hence tainted (as 
indicated in Figure 15 as a grey area). When the pointer ap sweeps over the stack and 
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points to buf, *ap becomes tainted. ap is then dereferenced in Line L1, and the tainted 
value of *ap is the target address of  the write operation. This can lead to the corruption 
of an arbitrary memory location. Thus we see that pointer taintedness is the root cause of 
this vulnerability. Note that the pointer *ap gets tainted because ap moves into the 
tainted memory locations, and there is no explicit assignment of a tainted value to *ap in 
the C code. Hence a memory model is necessary to reason about the taintedness of *ap. 
The next section defines the formal semantics of pointer taintedness using a memory 
model, and Section 5.3 shows how the semantics can be used to reason about security 
vulnerabilities in library functions. 
5.1.2. Heap Corruption Vulnerability  
Heap corruption vulnerabilities (including heap buffer overflow and double free) 
may result in modifying arbitrary memory locations and execution of an arbitrary code. 
To illustrate heap corruption vulnerabilities, we ported an implementation of binary 
buddy heap management system (originally implemented on Windows) to Linux. 
 
Table 9: Heap Corruption Vulnerability Illustration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L1 
 
L2 
L3 
L4 
typedef struct _HEAP_BLOCK { 
    int             Size;           // The size of the block. 
    int             Busy;           // Is this block busy? 
    struct _HEAP_BLOCK * Fwd,* Bak;  // List to the free blocks 
                                     //     of same size 
} HEAP_BLOCK, * PHEAP_BLOCK; 
void Free(PVOID p) 
{   HEAP_BLOCK * BuddyBlock; 
    … … 
    BuddyBlock->Fwd->Bak=BuddyBlock->Bak ; 
    … … 
} 
void foo() { 
} 
int main() 
{   char * p; 
    void (*f)(); 
    f=foo; 
    p = Malloc(40);     
    printf("At the begining, f=%p p=%p\n",f,p); 
    *(UINT*)(p+60)=(UINT)p; 
    *(UINT*)(p+56)=((UINT)&f)-12; 
    Free(p); 
    printf("\nAfter Free, f and p are identical:"); 
    printf("f=%p p=%p\n",f,p); 
} 
Program output: 
At the begining, f=0x80488cc p=0x8049170 
After Free, f and p are identical: f=0x8049170 p=0x8049170 
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 The implemented heap management code consists of two functions Malloc() and 
Free()14 functionally similar to LibC malloc() and free(). Table 9 illustrates how 
to make a function pointer f pointing to a buffer p by corrupting the heap structure. Line 
L1 allocates a 40-byte buffer to p. Suppose the locations of (p+56) and (p+60) are 
tainted by attackers due to buffer overrun or double free vulnerabilities, they can be 
corrupted in such a way that is similar to the effect of Lines L2 and L3 (in real attack 
scenarios, L2 and L3 are performed in attacker’s programs). The buddy heap system 
organizes unallocated memory blocks as several double-linked lists called free-chunk 
lists. Figure 16 shows an example list of free-chunks. In the implementation, the header 
of free-chunks is defined as HEAP_BLOCK structure. Figure 16 shows four 
HEAP_BLOCKs. HEAP_BLOCK 1, 3 and 4 form the free-chunk double-linked list. 
(p+56) is the location of the forward link (Fwd) of p’s buddy block, and (p+60) is the 
location of the backward link (Bak) of p’s buddy block. We use FreedBlock to 
represent the heap block containing buffer p. When the buffer p is freed by the function 
Free(), FreedBlock’s buddy block should be removed from its free-chunk double-
linked list and merged with FreedBlock to form a larger free-chunk. The removal of 
FreedBlock’s buddy block is performed in Line L0, which reads BuddyBlock-
>Fwd->Bak=BuddyBlock->Bak. However, because BuddyBlock->Fwd and 
BuddyBlock->Bak are corrupted in Lines L2 and L3, the effect of executing Line L0 
becomes *((((UINT)&f)-12)+12)=(UINT)p, which is equivalent to f=p (Note 
that “12” is the offset of the Bak field in the HEAP_BLOCK structure). As we see in the 
second line of the output, after Free() is called, the function pointer f now points to the 
buffer p. If the buffer p contains attacker’s malicious code, calling function pointer f 
later will execute the malicious code. In this example, we again observe the scenario of 
tainted pointers (i.e., BuddyBlock->Fwd and BuddyBlock->Bak) being de-
referenced in Line L0. 
                                                 
14
 The source code of Malloc() and Free() are given in Appendix B. 
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Figure 16: Normal Heap Structure before Buffer p is freed 
5.1.3. Stack Buffer Overflow  
Stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities are most well-known vulnerabilities. We also 
constructed a proof-of-concept program for this type of vulnerability, which aims to 
overwrite the return address by copying a user-input string to a buffer on the stack. In 
other words, return addresses are tainted by user input. Due to space limitation, we do not 
illustrate this well-known vulnerability category here.   
5.1.4. Glob() Vulnerabilities 
Globbing is the UNIX filename matching functionality. It matches filenames with a 
pattern containing wildcards. For example, when a user issues an UNIX command ls 
~/*.txt, all filenames ending with .txt on the user’s home directory are listed.15 We 
found five entries in Bugtraq due to globbing vulnerabilities. Bugtraq ID: 2548, Bugtraq 
ID: 2550 and Bugtraq ID: 2552 are buffer overflow vulnerabilities. The causes of these 
vulnerabilities are discussed in previous sections. 
The causes of Bugtraq ID: 3581 (Wu-Ftpd File Globbing Heap Corruption 
Vulnerability) and Bugtraq ID: 3707 (Glibc File Globbing Heap Corruption 
Vulnerability) are not buffer overflow, but both vulnerability descriptions also show the 
existence of pointer taintedness situations. Table 10 is compiled from the vulnerability 
description of Bugtraq ID: 3707. We see that when the four characters 
\xef\xef\xbe\xad\xde are embedded in the input, the values of registers ESI and 
                                                 
15
 Use UNIX command “man 7 glob” to see the full description of globbing functionality. 
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edi become 0xdeadbeef. Eventually this data is used as the pointer to be freed, which 
is another instance of pointer taintedness. Note that the description of Bugtraq ID: 3581 
is similar to this scenario. 
Table 10: Glibc Glob() Vulnerability Description 
Attacker’s interaction with FTP server 
   -> PASS AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\xef\xef\xbe\xad\xde # ( <19 Bytes> <Addr 
towrite> <Glob char>) 
   : 230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply. 
   -> STAT ~AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA{ 
 
Consequence of the attack 
  Examination of the registers shows that we have successfully inserted the 
intended address.  
           esi            0xdeadbeef        
           edi            0xdeadbeef        
  On giving the ftp daemon a valid address to free, the daemon will continue to 
free() the address we gave it.   
 
5.2. Semantics for Pointer Taintedness 
Starting with the programming semantics of Goguen and Malcolm [35], this section 
proposes a formal semantics to reason about pointer taintedness in programs. The 
semantics proposed in [35] defines instructions, variables and expressions. We extend 
this semantics to include memory locations and addresses. Using the memory model, the 
notion of taintedness is incorporated into the semantics.  
We define tainted data as: (1) data coming from input devices (e.g., by scanf(), 
fscanf(), recv(), recvfrom()), or (2) data copied or arithmetically calculated 
from tainted data16. A tainted pointer is a pointer whose value (semantically equivalent to 
“data”) is tainted. This definition can be formalized in equational logic using the Maude 
tool [22], which we used to reason about pointer taintedness.  
In the semantics defined in [35], a Store represents the current state of all program 
variables. We extend this definition of a Store to be a snapshot of the entire memory 
state at a point in the program execution. The execution of a program instruction is 
defined as a function taking two arguments, a Store and an instruction, and producing 
another Store. There are two attributes associated with every memory location of a 
Store: content and taintedness. Accordingly, two operations, fetch and location-
                                                 
16
 Taintedness is only propagated by arithmetic operations, such as +, * and arithmetic shifts. As a counter example, p 
is not a tainted value after the following C statement: if (taintedValue>0) p=&fun1(); else 
p=&fun2();  
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taintedness, are formally defined. The fetch operation Ftch(S,I) gives the content of 
the address I in store S; the location-taintedness operation LocT(S,I) returns a 
Boolean value indicating whether the content of the specified address is tainted.  
There is no notion of “variable” in this semantics. Any variable in a C program is 
mapped to a memory location addressed by the integer with the same name as the 
program variable. For example, the C program variable foo is mapped as a memory 
location addressed by the integer foo. We define the ^ operator to dereference an integer, 
i.e., to fetch the location addressed by the integer. Note that the address (a.k.a., the left 
value) of the C program variable foo is represented by the integer foo in the semantics; 
and the content (a.k.a., the right value) of the C program variable foo is represented by 
(^ foo). The expressions in the semantics are arithmetic operators (e.g., +, - and *) 
concatenating integers and integer dereferences. For example, expression 200+(^foo) 
represents  “200 plus the content of the C program variable foo”. Expression 200+foo 
represents “200 plus the address of the C program variable foo”.  
We define two operations – evaluation and expression-taintedness – for expressions 
based on the fetch and location-taintedness operations. The evaluation operation 
Eval(S,E) gives the result of evaluating the expression E under store S; the 
expression-taintedness operation ExpT(S,E) indicates whether expression E contains 
any data from a tainted location, e.g., ExpT(S,(^foo)+2) indicates whether the 
expression (^foo)+2 contains any data from a tainted location, which is equivalent to 
checking whether the memory location addressed by foo is tainted. Thus pointer 
taintedness is defined as a dereference of a tainted expression. 
Table 11 lists a set of axioms for the evaluation and expression-taintedness 
operations, and gives examples of applying the equations for deduction. Lines 1-6 define 
how to evaluate an expression under store S. For example, line 1 indicates that the 
evaluation result of a constant I under store S is the constant I. Line 2 indicates that 
Eval(S,^E1) can be computed by first evaluating E1 under S, then applying fetch 
operation on the evaluation result. The semantics of arithmetic operations are defined in 
Lines 3-6.  
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Table 11: Axioms of Evaluation and Expression-Taintedness Operations 
 Axioms Examples  
1 
2 
 
3 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
 
7 
8 
 
9 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
Eval(S,I) =  I  
Eval(S,^E1) = Ftch(S,Eval(S,E1))  
 
Eval(S,-E1) = -Eval(S,E1) 
Eval(S,E1–E2) =  Eval(S,E1)-Eval(S,E2) 
 
Eval(S,E1+E2) =  Eval(S,E1)+Eval(S,E2)  
 
Eval(S,E1*E2) =  Eval(S,E1)*Eval(S, E2) 
 
 
ExpT (S,I) = false  
ExpT(S,^E1) = LocT(S,Eval(S,E1))  
 
ExpT(S,-E1) = ExpT(S,E1)  
ExpT(S,E1-E2) = ExpT(S,E1) or ExpT(S,E2) 
 
ExpT(S,E1+E2) = ExpT(S,E1) or ExpT(S,E2) 
 
ExpT(S,E1*E2) = ExpT(S,E1) or ExpT(S,E2) 
Eval(S,5) = 5 
Eval(S,^foo) = Ftch(S,Eval(S,foo)) 
             = Ftch(S,foo) 
Eval(S, - 30) = - Eval(S, 30) = - 30 
Eval(S, 3-2) = Eval(S, 3) – Eval(S, 2)  
             = 3 – 2 = 1 
Eval(S, 3+2) = Eval(S, 3) + Eval(S, 2)  
             = 3 + 2 = 5 
Eval(S, 3*2) = Eval(S, 3) * Eval(S, 2)  
             = 3 * 2 = 6 
 
ExpT(S,5) = false 
ExpT(S,^foo) = LocT(S,Eval(S,foo))   
             =LocT(S,foo) 
ExpT(S, -5) = ExpT(S, 5)= false 
ExpT(S,(^foo)–2)=ExpT(S,(^foo))orExpT(S, 2) 
      = LocT(S,foo) or false =  LocT(S,foo) 
ExpT(S,(^foo)+2)=ExpT(S,(^foo))or ExpT(S, 2) 
      = LocT(S,foo) or false =  LocT(S,foo) 
ExpT(S,(^foo)*2)=ExpT(S,(^foo))or ExpT(S, 2) 
      = LocT(S,foo) or false =  LocT(S,foo) 
Lines 7-12 define the expression-taintedness operator. Note that the relationship 
between the expression-taintedness and location-taintedness operators is similar to the 
relationship between the evaluation and fetch operators. Line 7 indicates that an integer 
constant is not a tainted expression. Line 8 indicates that determining whether the 
expression ^E1 is tainted is equivalent to checking whether the location addressed by the 
evaluation result of E1 is tainted. Line 11 indicates that the expression E1+E2 is tainted if 
either E1 or E2 is tainted. The example of Line 12 shows that the expression (^foo) + 
2 is tainted if and only if the location pointed to by foo is tainted, according to the 
equation in Lines 7 and 8. 
Table 12: Semantics of Statements 
Statement Semantics 
mov [E1] <- E2 Move the evaluation result of the expression E2 to the memory location 
addressed by the evaluation result of the expression E1 
if T then P1 
else P2 fi  
If the condition T is true, Execute P1 
otherwise execute P2 
while T do P od If the condition T is true, execute P, repeat until T is false  
Table 12 gives the informal semantics of a subset of the supported statements. Their 
formal semantics are similar to the specifications given in [35], and are sufficient to 
analyze a wide variety of program constructs in the C language. However, they are not 
sufficient to faithfully model all C statements. For example, the program counter has not 
been defined in the semantics. So certain C statements, such as goto, break, 
continue, return and exit cannot be modeled, but it is relatively easy to extend 
the semantics for these also.  
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Formal specifications of statements other than the mov statement are fairly 
straightforward. Axioms defining mov statement semantics are shown in Table 13. The 
goal is to define the fetch and location-taintedness operations after applying a mov 
instruction on store S. The semicolon operator in our notation represents the execution of 
an instruction on a store, which results in a new store. For example, (S ; mov 
[E1]<-E2) is the store after executing mov [E1]<-E2 on store S. Line 1 indicates 
that if the expression E1 evaluates to X1 under store S, then when fetching the location 
X1 after executing the instruction mov [E1]<-E2, we get the evaluation result of E2 
under store S. Line 2 indicates that if the expression E1 does not evaluate to X1 under S, 
then when fetching the location X1 after executing the instruction mov [E1]<-E2, we 
still get the content in the location X1 under S (i.e., before executing the instruction mov 
[E1]<-E2). Similarly, the location-taintedness semantics are defined for mov statement 
in Lines 3 and 4. 
Table 13: Equations Defining mov Statement Semantics  
1 
2 
3 
4 
Ftch((S; mov [E1]<-E2),X1) = Eval(S,E2) if (Eval(S,E1) is X1) . 
Ftch((S; mov [E1]<-E2),X1) = Ftch(S,X1) if not (Eval(S,E1) is X1) .  
LocT((S; mov [E1]<-E2),X1) = ExpT(S,E2) if (Eval(S,E1) is X1) . 
LocT((S; mov [E1]<-E2),X1) = LocT(S,X1) if not (Eval(S,E1) is X1) . 
5.3. Formal Reasoning of Pointer Taintedness Violations 
This section performs pointer taintedness analysis for three common library 
functions based on the defined semantics, and extracts their associated security 
preconditions. The analysis identifies several well-known vulnerabilities, such as format 
string, buffer overflow and heap corruption vulnerabilities, thereby showing that pointer 
taintedness based reasoning is able to unify different kinds of vulnerabilities.  
Our experience suggests that statements needing critical examination for pointer 
taintedness are typically indirect writes, where a pointer points to a target address to be 
written, e.g., the pointer p in *p = foo and memcpy(p,foo,10). Checking indirect 
write statements is important because these statements can result in two types of pointer 
taintedness violations. For example, in the statement *p = foo, (1) if the value of p is 
tainted, then data foo can be written to any memory location; (2) if p is a pointer of a 
buffer but points to a location outside the buffer, then the statement *p = foo can taint 
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the memory location p points to, which may be a location of a return address, a function 
frame pointer or another pointer.  
5.3.1. Analysis of strcpy() 
A simple but interesting example is strcpy(), which copies a NULL-terminated 
source string to a destination buffer. The string manipulation functions, including 
strcpy(), strcat() and sprintf(), are known to cause a significant number of 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Our formal reasoning extracts security conditions from 
the implementation of strcpy(). The source code of strcpy() and its formal 
representation are given in Table 14.   
Table 14: Source Code and Formal Semantics of strcpy() 
char * strcpy (char *dst,  
               char *src) { 
    char * res; 
    res =dst; 
    while (*src!=0) { 
1:    *dst=*src; 
      dst++; 
      src++; 
     } 
2:  *dst=0; 
    return res; 
} 
 
 
 
      mov [res] <- (^ dst) ; 
      while (~((^ ^ src) is 0)) do  
L1:      mov [^ dst] <- (^ ^ src) ; 
          mov [dst] <- (^dst + 1) ; 
          mov [src] <- (^ src + 1) 
      od ; 
L2:  mov [^ dst] <- 0 . 
Because the only indirect write operations in the source code are in Line 1 and Line 
2, two theorems listed in Table 15 need to be proved. We assume that the NULL-
terminator (i.e., the character ‘\0’) of the source string src is at the location (src + 
srclen), and that the size of the buffer dst is dstsize. Theorem NV1 ensures that 
before Line L1, the content of the variable dst is not tainted; Theorem NV2 ensures that 
after Line L1, the content of the srclenth location in the buffer pointed by dst is not 
tainted. This condition eliminates the possibility of buffer overflow. NV3 is similar to 
NV1, but proves the property for the memory state before Line L2 is executed. The 
security pre-conditions extracted are shown in Table 18. 
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Table 15: Theorems to Prove for Function strcpy() 
Theorem NV1: If S1 is the store before Line L1, then 
LocT(S1,dst) = false  
Theorem NV2: If S2 is the store after Line L1, then  
ExpT(S2, (^dst) + dstsize) = false 
Theorem NV3: If S3 is the store before Line L2, then 
LocT(S3,dst) = false 
Table 16 gives a set of security preconditions extracted in the process of proving the 
theorems. Among the four preconditions, Condition 4 is well known because of the large 
number of buffer overflow vulnerabilities caused by string manipulation. This condition 
has already been documented on Linux MAN page of strcpy. Condition 2 indicates the 
scenario of overlap between src and dst. This is examined further in Section 5.4.1. 
Violation of Condition 3 may occur when a program miscalculates the location of a stack 
buffer, causing the function frame of strcpy() to be covered by the buffer and a 
sample code violating the condition is given in Section 5.4.2. 
  
Table 16: Sufficient Conditions to Ensure the Validity of Theorems NV1 – NV3 
1. Initially, the location of dst is not tainted.  
2. The buffers src and dst do not overlap in such a way that the buffer dst covers the NULL-
terminator of the src string.  
3. The buffer dst does not cover the function frame of strcpy(), which consists of the locations 
&dst, &src and &res.  
4. srclen < dstsize 
5.3.2. Analysis of free() 
We implemented a binary buddy heap management system including function 
malloc() and free(). The memory block to be freed is pointed to by pointer 
FreedBlock. The binary buddy heap management algorithm requires the deallocated 
memory block FreedBlock to be merged with its buddy block if the buddy block is 
also free. The pointer BuddyBlock points to the buddy block. FreedBlock and 
BuddyBlock are structs of type HEAP_BLOCK as shown in Table 17. The Size field 
indicates the size of the memory chunk. The Busy field indicates whether the memory 
chunk is free. Fields Fwd and Bak are pointers to maintain a doubly-link list of free 
memory chunks.  
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Table 17: Indirect Write Statements in Free() Source Code 
typedef struct _HEAP_BLOCK { 
    int             Size;           // The size of the block. 
    int             Busy;           // Is this block busy? 
struct _HEAP_BLOCK * Fwd,* Bak; // List to the free blocks of 
                                // the same size 
} HEAP_BLOCK; 
There are three lines in the Free() function where indirect write operations are 
performed. Six pointers are involved in the operations, including FreedBlock, 
BuddyBlock, FreedBlock->Fwd, FreedBlock->Bak, BuddyBlock-
>Fwd and BuddyBlock->Bak. Table 18 states the theorems to be proved for 
conditions guaranteeing that pointers are not tainted. The following discussion assumes 
that the offset of the Fwd field in the HEAP_BLOCK structure is 2, and that the offset of 
the Bak field is 3. Theorem NV1 ensures that none of the six pointers is tainted before 
executing any indirect writes. 
Table 18: Theorems to Prove for Function Free() 
Theorem NV1: If S is the store before executing the indirect 
writes, then 
(ExpT(S, (^ FreedBlock)) = false) and    
(ExpT(S, (^ BuddyBlock)) = false) and    
(ExpT(S, ^((^ FreedBlock)+2) = false)  and 
(ExpT(S, ^((^ FreedBlock)+3) = false)  and 
 (ExpT(S, ^((^ BuddyBlock)+2) = false)  and 
(ExpT(S, ^((^ BuddyBlock)+ 3) = false)   
 
 
//FreedBlock is not tainted     
//BuddyBlock is not tainted     
//FreedBlock->Fwd is not tainted 
//FreedBlock->Bak is not tainted 
//BuddyBlock->Fwd is not tainted 
//BuddyBlock->Bak is not tainted 
The process of proving the theorems extracted a set of formally specified conditions 
that guarantee the validity of Theorem NV1. Table 19 describes the conditions. The 
function Free() is safe to be called when the caller function can guarantee these 
conditions. Violations of condition 1 are unlikely to occur, and the same is true for 
condition 7. Violations of condition 6 cause the classic double-free errors, and violations 
of condition 3 and 4 lead to the popular heap buffer overflow vulnerability. An example 
illustrating violation of condition 2 is presented in Section 5.4.3.  
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Table 19: Sufficient Conditions to Ensure the Validity of Theorem NV1  
1. The memory range of the heap and the memory range of the current function frame do not overlap. 
2. Immediately before Free() is called, FreedBlock points to a location in the range of the heap. 
3. Immediately before Free() is called, the Fwd and Bak links of the block of FreedBlock are 
not tainted. 
4. All free-chunk double-linked lists are within the heap range, i.e., no Fwd or Bak links points to any 
location outside the heap. 
5. No Fwd or Bak pointers in any free-chunk double-linked list are tainted. 
6. Immediately before Free() is called, FreedBlock is not linked in any free-chunk double-linked 
list. 
7. If BuddyBlock is freed, then BuddyBlock is linked in a free-chunk double-linked list. 
5.3.3. Analysis of printf() 
We implemented a function Printf(), similar to the LibC function printf(), 
except that Printf()calls its child function Vfprintf(), which is a simplified 
version of LibC function vfprintf().Vfprintf()implements the format directives 
%%, %d, %s and %n. The total length of Vfprintf()is 55 lines. Pointer p is used to 
sweep over the format string format. The argument list is swept over by pointer ap.  
There are only two lines of indirect write operations in the function (Table 20). Line 
L1 is to get the last digit of data and save it in the nth position of the buffer buf.  Line L2 
is to assign the character count to the memory location pointed by the current argument. 
Note that ap is the argument list pointer pointing to the current argument.  
Corresponding to the two indirect write operations, we need to prove the theorems 
given in  
Table 21. Theorem NV1A ensures that before executing code in Line L1, the 
memory location hosting the variable n is not tainted. Theorem NV1B ensures that after 
Line L1, the memory location buf+10 is not tainted. Theorem NV2 ensures that before 
Line L2, the expression (^ ^ ap) is not tainted, i.e., the memory location pointed by 
(^ ap) is not tainted, i.e., the memory location pointed by the content of variable ap is 
not tainted. 
Table 20: Indirect Write Statements in Vfprintf() Source Code 
L1:   buf[n]=data%10+'0';  
L2:   *(int*)ap = count ;  
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Table 21: Theorems Need to Prove for Vfprintf() 
Theorem NV1A: If S is the store before executing Line L1, then  
ExpT(S,(^ n)) = false 
Theorem NV1B: If S is the store after executing Line L1, then   
LocT(S,(buf + 10)) = false  
Theorem NV2: If S is the store before executing Line L2, then  
ExpT(S, (^ ^ ap)) = false 
Theorem NV1A and NV1B are easily proved without the necessity of specifying any 
preconditions. However, the proof of NV2 could not be established, as the theorem prover was 
unable to proceed after certain point, which suggested our proof obligations. After proving the 
obligations as lemmas or specifying them as preconditions, the proof process was able to 
complete. Eventually, when the theorem is proved, we obtain a list of formally specified 
preconditions, which are described in Table 22. 
Table 22: Sufficient Conditions to Ensure the Validity of Theorem NV2 
1. ap never points to any location within the current function frame. 
2. *ap never points to the location of variable ap, i.e., *ap != &ap. 
3. Suppose the memory segment that ap sweeps over is called ap_activitiy_range, no locations within 
ap_activitiy_range are tainted before Vfprintf() is called. 
4. *ap never points to any location within ap_activitiy_range. 
The four conditions form a set of sufficient conditions, which if satisfied, guarantee 
that there is no pointer taintedness situation in the analyzed version of Vfprintf(). 
Format string vulnerabilities do not satisfy condition 3 (Table 22). As illustrated in Figure 
15, the tainted data (word 0x08049978) is located in the activity range of ap, i.e., ap 
points to this data. For the other three conditions, we are currently unaware of any 
existing applications violating them. It is the programmers’ responsibility to ensure the 
validity of these hidden assumptions.  
5.4. Examples Illustrating Violations of Library Functions’ 
Preconditions 
In the previous section, we have given a significant number of preconditions for 
common library functions. Not all of them are likely to occur in real application code. In 
this section, we give possible scenarios (constructed examples) in which some of the 
preconditions detailed in the previous section are violated, and explain how an attacker 
can exploit them.  To the best of our knowledge, these vulnerabilities have not been 
reported in any real application or described in the literature. 
 71 
5.4.1. Example of strcpy() Violation – Condition 2 
Condition 2 in Table 16 for strcpy() states that the buffer dst does not cover 
the function frame of strcpy(), which consists of dst, src and res. Otherwise it is 
possible to overwrite the stack frame of strcpy() and modify the address of the dst 
string. Since strcpy() can write to the location (*dst), this can be used to write to 
any memory location, including function pointers, and hence transfer control to malicious 
code.  
Consider the code sample in Table 23a, in which buf and input are allocated on 
the stack in the function frame of foo(). The string input is obtained from the user 
and passed as the src argument of strcpy().  The dst argument of strcpy() is 
buf + index, where index is computed by subtracting the length of input from the 
end of the buffer buf. After strcpy() is called, the stack frame looks as shown in 
Table 23b. Assume that the attacker enters an input string longer than 20 bytes as input. 
Since the input buffer has a size of 100 bytes, this may not cause buffer overflow. 
However, this makes the value of index computed to become negative, which in turn 
makes dst point to a stack location before buf and in the function frame of strcpy() 
(thereby violating the pre-condition). In the above example, setting the index to (-16) 
makes dst point to the location of itself on the stack. The strcpy() code then writes 
to the location of (*dst), thereby overwriting dst itself. Subsequent writes to (*dst) 
then modify the contents of the location pointed to by this new value of dst. This allows 
the attacker to write any value to any memory location, including potentially sensitive 
locations such as function pointers. 
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Table 23: Violation of Condition 2 of strcpy() 
a) Sample Code 
void foo(  ) { 
  int index;  
  char input[100]; 
  char buf[20]; 
  scanf(“%s”, input ); 
  index = 20 –  strlen( input ); 
  strcpy( buf+index ,input ); 
} 
b) Stack Status 
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The functionality of the code shown in Table 23a is to push data to the end of a 
buffer. We believe it is possible that applications require such a functionality. For 
example, a program may need to copy data at the end of a buffer and prefix headers in 
front the data. The pointer arithmetic shown in Table 23a is an efficient means of 
implementing such an operation, so we argue that the sample code demonstrates a 
possible scenario in real applications.  
5.4.2. Example of strcpy() Violation – Condition 3 
In Table 16, condition 3 of strcpy() states that src and dst do not overlap in 
such a way that dst covers the null-terminator of src, otherwise the null-terminator of 
src string gets overwritten and the program can go into an infinite loop. This can happen 
in two ways: by a buffer overflow error or by an inadvertent free error, as illustrated in 
Table 24a and Table 24b, respectively. 
Table 24: Two Cases Depicting Examples of strcpy() Condition 3 Violations 
a) Buffer Overflow Error 
char* src = malloc(20);   
char* dst = malloc(20); 
sprintf(src,”string with > 20 
characters”);  
strcpy(dst, src);   
 
b) Inadverent Free Error 
src = malloc(40); 
snprintf(src, 30, “some string of   
         30 or more characters”); 
free( src ); 
foo = malloc (10); 
dst = malloc(20); 
strcpy( dst, src ); 
In the first piece of code (Table 24a), two buffers are allocated on the heap and one 
of them is overflowed. This buffer is then passed as the src argument to strcpy(), 
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and the other one as the dst argument. Upon running this code multiple times17, we 
found that the memory manager consistently allocated nearly consecutive, successive 
memory addresses to src and dst respectively. As a result, when the src buffer is 
overflowed, its contents spill into the dst buffer, causing it to overlap with the src string 
and cover the null-terminator, leading to a violation of the pre-condition. Note that this 
can happen even if the source and destination buffers are not nearly contiguous, provided 
that the address of the destination buffer is greater than the address of the source buffer 
and the input string is long enough to overflow into the destination buffer. 
The src and dst arguments can also overlap if the destination buffer is allocated 
from some portion of the source buffer. This situation is illustrated in Table 24b. Here src 
is first allocated on the heap and then freed, which returns the src buffer to the free pool. 
When malloc() requests are made subsequently for foo and dst, the memory 
manager reuses the block most recently returned to it, namely the src buffer, for 
allocating the buffers foo and dst. When strcpy() is called, src and dst overlap 
in such a way that dst covers the null terminator of src, which is a violation of the pre-
condition. In real codes, this can happen as a result of using a buffer that is freed on an 
infrequently executed path in the code and may not be uncovered during testing.  
5.4.3. Example of free() Violation – Condition 2 
Condition 2 of the free() function in Table 19 states that the pointer passed to 
free() must be within the heap range. This arises from the fact that the free() 
function itself does not perform this check. When a block is freed, the free() function 
checks for an integer value at the beginning of the block, which represents the size of the 
block to be freed. If it finds such an integer, it does the free, irrespective of whether the 
block is on the heap or not.  
Consider what happens when a local buffer on the stack is passed to the free() 
function in Table 25. In this code, the local array buf of function foo() is passed to the 
function print_str(), which checks if the length of the string passed to it is more 
than the value n specified by the user, and if so, frees the buffer. The pointer p which is 
                                                 
17
 We tried it with GNU-LIBC on both x86-linux and Sun Solaris platforms. Our results indicate that this is not an OS 
or platform specific phenomenon, but a feature of GNU-LIBC. 
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freed by print_str() is aliased to buf, which is allocated on the stack in the 
function frame of foo(), leading to a violation of the pre-condition. Since this happens 
only when the user enters a string of more than 50 characters, it may not be uncovered 
while testing. In this example, the integer i, which is a local variable of foo() is  
present on the stack at the beginning of the block buf. The free() function assumes 
that this is the size of the buffer buf and attempts to deallocate a block of that size. Since 
the user also supplies this value, it is possible to free a block of any arbitrary size on the 
stack, and overwrite the contents of any memory location.  
Table 25: Violation of Condition 2 of free() 
void foo() { 
   char buf[100]; 
   int i; 
   scanf(“%d”, &i); 
   scanf(“%s”, buf); 
   print_str( buf  , 50); 
} 
void print_str( char* p, int n ) { 
   if ( strlen(p) > n ) {            
          free( p ); 
          return; 
  }  
  printf(stdout, “%s”, p);        
} 
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CHAPTER 6  
DEFEATING SECURITY ATTACKS BY POINTER 
TAINTEDNESS DETECTION 
 
6.1. Architectural Support for Pointer Taintedness Detection 
The theorem-proving-based static analysis technique presented in CHAPTER 5 helps 
in formal reasoning about pointer taintedness, and thus exposes potential security 
vulnerabilities. This chapter shows that the concept of pointer taintedness also enables an 
effective runtime detection technique, an architecture-level mechanism completely 
transparent to applications. Unlike the static analysis technique, the runtime detection 
technique cannot expose potential security vulnerabilities; it can only detect attacks when 
they occur. In this sense, the static analysis technique discussed earlier and the runtime 
detection technique in this chapter are not competing, butcomplementary.  
The runtime detection mechanism is implemented as multiple components. In order 
to implement the taintedness-aware memory model presented in CHAPTER 5, the 
existing memory system is extended by adding an additional taintedness bit to each byte. 
The taintedness bit is set whenever data from input devices is copied into the memory. 
Within the processor execution engine, the taintedness bit is propagated when tainted 
data are used for an operation. Whenever a tainted word is used as an address value for 
memory access (data or code accesses), an exception is raised by the processor. The 
operating system then handles the exception and stops the current process to defeat the 
ongoing attack. 
6.1.1. Extended Memory Architecture 
The memory system architecture is extended to support the notion of taintedness. A 
taintedness bit is associated with each byte in memory. When a memory word is accessed 
by the processor, the taintedness bits are passed through the memory hierarchy together 
with the actual memory words. L2 and L1 caches and data storage within the processor 
(registers and buffers) are also extended with the additional taintedness bits.  
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The detection mechanism is designed on top of the extended memory model. 
Although the underlying principle is general enough to be applicable to other 
architectures, the discussion is given in the context of SimpleScalar RISC architecture. 
Figure 17 gives the enhancements of the pointer taintedness detection mechanism 
implemented as extensions of SimpleScalar. 
6.1.2. Taintedness Tracking 
When a program performs operations using its data from memory, the taintedness bit 
should be propagated. The processor pipeline is modified to track taintedness. In general, 
any CPU operation that uses tainted data as source should produce a tainted result. This 
mechanism is similar to the ones proposed in [26] and [73]. 
We distinguish between memory operations and ALU operations. A memory load 
operation moves data from memory to a processor register, and a store operation moves 
data from a processor register to memory. Corresponding to the one-bit extension to each 
memory byte, the processor registers are also extended to include one taintedness bit for 
each byte. For each load instruction, the data bits as well as the taintedness bits are copied 
from memory to register along the load path. Similarly, store instructions write normal 
data bytes as well as taintedness bits to the memory along the store path. 
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Figure 17: Architecture Design of Pointer Taintedness Tracking and Detection 
ALU instructions are responsible for propagating taintedness between registers. The 
propagation is implemented by the ALU taintedness tracking logic (shown as a shaded 
area in Figure 17). With the few exceptions noted below, the ALU taintedness works as 
follows: for operations with two source operands, the taintedness bits of a resultant 
register are obtained by the bitwise OR of the corresponding taintedness bits in the source 
operand registers. For example, after executing ADD R1,R2,R3, R1 is tainted if and only 
if R2 is tainted or R3 is tainted.  
The following exceptional cases require special handling. (1) Shift instructions cause 
taintedness to propagate within the operand register. If a byte in the operand register is 
tainted, then the taintedness bit of its adjacent byte along the direction of shifting is set to 
1. (2) The taintedness bits of any byte AND-ed with an untainted zero are cleared, 
because the resulting byte value is constant 0, regardless of user input. (3) The compiler 
idiom XOR R1,R2,R2 is frequently used to assign constant 0 to the target register R1. The 
taintedness bits in R1 are cleared as a result. This idea is borrowed from previous 
techniques [26] and [73]. (4) Compare instructions are used for data range checking. If a 
tainted register R1 is compared with some untainted data in R2, the taintedness bits in R1 
are cleared after the operation. The rationale is that programmers often write input 
validation code to check certain safety properties. The validation code is in the form of 
compare instructions. For application compatibility, any data that undergoes validation is 
trusted after such an operation. This could potentially lead to missed detection (a.k.a. 
false negatives),or example, in situations in which the program does check user input 
values but the check algorithm is flawed. The false negative scenarios are discussed in 
Section 6.2.3. 
Table 26 summarizes the taintedness tracking logic. The ALU taintedness tracking 
logic consists of a multiplexer (MUX) selecting from four sources of input based on the 
opcode of the current instruction. These multiplexer inputs correspond to the five types of 
ALU instructions listed above. 
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Table 26: Taintedness Propagation by ALU Instructions 
ALU Instruction Type Taintedness Propagation 
ALU instructions except shift, 
compare, and AND, e.g., op R1,R2,R3 
Tainedness of R1 =  (Taintedness of R2) or (Taintedness of R3). 
Shift instruction If a byte in the operand is tainted, the taintedness bit of its adjacent 
byte along the direction of shifting is set to 1. 
AND instruction Untaint each byte AND-ed with an untainted zero. 
XOR R1,R2,R2 Taintedness of R1 = 0000. 
Compare instruction  Untaint every byte in the operands of the compare instruction. 
6.1.3. Attack Detection 
In general, whenever a tainted data value is used for memory access, an alert should 
be raised. The proposed detection mechanism is described using the instruction set 
architecture of the SimpleScalar processor simulator. In SimpleScalar, only the load/store 
instructions and the jump instruction JR (i.e., jump to the address in a register) can 
dereference a pointer, which is stored in a register. The jump pointer taintedness detector 
is placed after the ID/EX (instruction decode/execution) stage when the jump target 
register value is available. The four taintedness bits in the target register are OR-ed. If 
any byte in the word is tainted, the output of the OR-gate is 1 and the instruction is 
marked as malicious. The detector of tainted pointers for load/store instructions is placed 
after the EX/MEM (execute/memory) stage; here the four taintedness bits of the address 
word are inputted into an OR-gate, and the instruction is marked as malicious if the 
output of the gate is 1 and the instruction opcode is load or store. The actual security 
exception is raised in the pipeline’s retirement stage. Retirement of an instruction marked 
as malicious causes the pipeline to raise a security exception. The operating system can 
then terminate the process and stop the ongoing intrusion. 
6.1.4. Taintedness Initialization 
Any data received from an external device that can potentially be controlled by a 
malicious user are considered tainted, e.g., input coming from network, file system, 
keyboard, command line arguments, and environmental variables. All such data are 
passed from an external source to the program buffer through operating system calls. The 
system call implementations are modified to mark every byte in the buffer as tainted 
when it is returning from kernel space to user space. This can be implemented by adding 
every word in the buffer to a special register RT. The value of RT is always 0, but every 
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taintedness bit of RT is 1. In the current implementation, the system call module of the 
SimpleScalar simulator is modified for this purpose. In particular, all data delivered to the 
application through the SYS_READ (local I/O) and SYS_RECV (network I/O) are 
marked as tainted. These two system calls are invoked by most input functions in C 
library, such as scanf(), fread(), recv() and recvfrom().   
In summary, three subsystems in the SimpleScalar simulator are modified to 
implement the algorithm: (1) The memory subsystem is extended with the taintedness 
bits in the memory, the cache, and the register file. (2) The original system call 
implementation is modified so that SYS_READ and SYS_RECV mark every byte in the 
receiving buffer as tainted. (3) The instruction pipeline is extended to implement 
taintedness calculation, propagation, and detection. 
6.2. Evaluation 
The proposed architecture has the following properties: (1) high coverage in detecting 
attacks tampering with both control and non-control data; (2) transparency to applications, 
i.e., the detection does not rely on any internal knowledge of the applications, e.g., buffer 
sizes, variable upper bounds, or program semantics; (3) no known false positives; and (4) 
very small space overhead and performance overhead. These properties are evaluated by 
running synthetic programs, real network applications, and SPEC benchmarks on the 
proposed architecture. 
6.2.1.  Security Protection Coverage 
The pointer taintedness detection technique provides a significant improvement in 
security coverage by protecting applications from both control data attacks and non-
control-data attacks. The security coverage of existing control-flow integrity based 
protections was evaluated against control data attacks only. This section shows that non-
control-data attacks do exist and can cause the same level of security compromise in 
many real applications. For a fair comparison, several applications are employed that 
were previously used to assess the existing techniques. 
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6.2.1.1. Synthetic Vulnerable Programs 
The effectiveness of the proposed approach is first demonstrated on a number of 
synthetic functions that are vulnerable to stack buffer overflow, heap corruption, and 
format string attacks respectively (Table 27).  
Table 27: Synthetic Vulnerable Programs 
Stack Buffer Overflow 
void exp1() { 
  char buf[10]; 
  scanf("%s",buf); 
}    
Heap Corruption Attack 
void exp2() { 
  char * buf; 
  buf = malloc(8); 
  scanf("%s",buffer); 
  free(p) 
} 
Format String Attack 
void  exp3(int s) { 
  char buf[100]; 
  recv(s,buf,100,0); 
  printf(buf); 
} 
 
Detection of stack buffer overflow. When a string of “a” characters of 24 bytes is 
passed to exp1() running on this architecture, an alert is raised at the return instruction 
(i.e., JR $31 on SimpleScalar) of exp1(), which indicates that the return address is 
tainted as 0x61616161, corresponding to four “a” characters in the input. 
Detection of heap corruption. Function exp2() contains a heap overflow 
vulnerability. An attack is launched by inputting 12 “a” characters to the 8-byte buffer. 
When the buffer is freed, a load-word instruction LW $3,0($3), which is in function 
free(), raises an alert. As described in Section 3, a statement executed in free() is 
B->fd->bk=B->bk. When the alert is generated, register $3 equals B->fd, which is 
a tainted word 0x61616161 due to the buffer overflow condition. Because the detected 
instruction attempts to dereference register $3 (i.e., the 0($3) indirect addressing mode) 
when its value is tainted, the alert is raised. 
Detection of format string attack. The effectiveness of detecting format string attacks 
is demonstrated by function exp3(). The function receives the string abcd%x%x%x%n 
from the socket. When printf() is called, a store-word instruction SW $21,0($3) 
in vfprintf() raises an alert. This store instruction is compiled from the statement 
*ap=count described in Section 5.1.1, where the value of ap is in register $3 and the 
value of count is in register $21. When the alert is raised, the value of register $3 in 
0($3) dereference is 0x64636261, corresponding to the first four bytes of the input 
string, “abcd”.  
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6.2.1.2. Real-World Network Applications 
The three examples discussed in the previous section demonstrate that pointer 
taintedness detection can defeat many types of memory corruption attacks. This section 
presents results from testing real-world attacks against network applications running on 
the SimpleScalar augmented with pointer taintedness detection capability. In addition, the 
SimpleScalar processor simulator is extended to support network socket applications. The 
enhancement allows us to run many real-world network server applications. Both control 
data attacks and non-control-data attacks are used for the evaluations. The pointer 
taintedness detection technique succeeds in defeating both types of attacks.   
WU-FTPD format string attack. Similar to the WU-FTPD attack described in 
CHAPTER 4, an attack is constructed to exploit the format string vulnerability to 
overwrite an integer word representing the ID of the login user. With a proper protection, 
this attack would escalate the attacker’s privilege to the root privilege, offering the 
attacker a full control on the file /etc/passwd so that he/she can upload a different 
version of this file. After writing a malicious entry such as 
“alice:x:0:0::/home/root:/bin/bash” in the new version, the attacker 
leaves a backdoor to login later as Alice, who possesses root privileges.  
 Now WU-FTPD is run on the proposed architecture. Table 28 shows the 
attack/detection steps. When the FTP server is ready to accept user input, the attacker (the 
FTP client) first authenticates to the server using USER and PASS commands, then issues 
a SITE EXEC command to exploit the vulnerability. The target integer word 
representing the user ID is located in the address 0x1002bc20, so the command used to 
overwrite this word is: 
site exec \x20\xbc\x02\x10%x%x%x%x%x%x%n 
Immediately after the attack sends the malicious SITE EXEC command, the pointer 
taintedness detector raises an alert indicating that the instruction SW $21,0($3) 
dereferences a tainted value in register $3. The value of the register is 0x1002bc20, 
the same as the one specified by the attacker as the target address to overwrite. The FTP 
server is stopped when the alert is raised, which effectively prevents the attack from 
succeeding. 
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Table 28: Attacking WU-FTPD on the Proposed Architecture 
FTP Server 220  FTP server (Version wu-2.6.0(60) Mon Nov 29 10:37:55 
CST 2004) ready. 
FTP Client user user1 
FTP Server 331 Password required for user1 . 
FTP Client pass xxxxxxx    (the correct password of user1) 
FTP Client  site exec \x20\xbc\x02\x10%x%x%x%x%x%x%n 
Alert 44d7b0: sw $21,0($3)           $3=0x1002bc20 
NULL HTTPD heap corruption attack. The attack discussed in CHAPTER 4 is used 
to test the detection effectiveness of the proposed architecture. The attack is an attempt to 
exploit the heap corruption vulnerability to overwrite CGI-BIN configuration string as 
/bin, allowing /bin/sh to be executed as a CGI program with the root privilege.  
To test the effectivenss of detection, NULL HTTPD is run on the proposed 
architecture. The attacker sends a POST command with a negative Content-Length value 
(-800) to cause a heap overflow condition on the server. If the attacker attempts to 
overwrite the CGI-BIN configuration, which is located in the address 0x1001717d, four 
characters \x7d\x71\x01\x10 need to be embedded in the POST command to 
precisely overwrite the heap free chunk doubly-linked list. If the overflowed buffer were 
freed, the corruption of CGI-BIN configuration would have been accomplished. Due to 
presence of the pointer taintedness detector, during the execution of function free(), 
the instruction LW $3,0($3) raises an alert to stop the application process. The value 
of register $3 is 0x1001717d, the address of the CGI-BIN configuration string.  
Table 29: Attacking NULL-HTTPD on the Proposed Architecture 
HTTP Server HTTP Daemon Ready 
HTTP Client POST / HTTP/1.0 
Content-Length: -800   
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA…AAAAA\x7d\x71\x01\x10…. 
Alert 409650: LW $3,0($3), $3=0x1001717d 
 
GHTTPD stack overflow attack. An attack is constructed to exploit the stack buffer 
overflow bug in GHTTPD. It is very similar to the attack presented in CHAPTER 4:  
When GHTTPD runs on the proposed architecture, a malicious request GET 
AAAAAA…AAAAAA\x94\x3e\xff\x7f↵↵/cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh is 
sent to the server. The first part of the request AAAAAA…AAAAAA 
\x94\x3e\xff\x7f is parsed as a URL. However, due to the buffer overflow 
vulnerability, the last four bytes overwrite the pointer of the URL to 0x7fff3e94, 
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which is the address of the second part of the string, /cgi-
bin/../../../../bin/sh. Without the protection provided by our architecture, 
this would force the server to run /bin/sh with root privileges. The pointer taintedness 
protection algorithm effectively stops the attack when the tainted URL pointer is 
dereferenced in an LB instruction. The alert indicates that register $4 has a tainted value 
0x7fff3e94 as specified in the malicious request, which is about to be dereferenced. 
Table 30: Attacking GHTTPD on the Proposed Architecture 
HTTP Server HTTP Daemon Ready 
HTTP Client GET AAAA…AAAA\x94\x3e\xff\x7f↵↵/cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh 
Alert 405e58: LB $7,0($4),  $4=0x7fff3e94 
 
Traceroute double free attack. Certain versions of LBNL traceroute are vulnerable 
to an attack involving freeing of a heap buffer not allocated by malloc() [44]. When 
traceroute is executed with the arguments "-g x -g y", savestr() is called twice 
to parse arguments “-g x” and “-g y”. savestr() reduces calls to malloc() by 
preallocating heap space and performs self buffer management when it is invoked 
subsequently. After “-g x” is parsed and savestr() is called, the pointer to the block 
used by savestr() is released using free(). When “–g y” is interpreted, 
savestr() is called again, and the result is written to the block of already freed 
memory. Like for “-g x”, free()is called, but this time on a region that has already 
been released in the first free() call. Traceroute crashes because free() is using an 
invalid pointer in an invalid malloc() header. A malicious user can take over 
traceroute using the double free attack method: it corrupts pointers used by 
malloc/free, then forces traceroute to overwrite critical program data or execute 
malicious code.  
This experiment uses the command line traceroute –g 123 –g 5.6.7.8. 
Without the detection mechanism, this results in a successful takeover. With the detection 
mechanism, an alert is generated at a store-word instruction inside free() because 
0x333231 is a tainted value when it is dereferenced as a pointer. 
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6.2.2. Evaluation of False Positives 
Along with system security, a crucial criterion of defensive systems is the false 
positive rate, i.e., the likelihood that the system raises an alert when there is no attack.  
The network applications discussed in Section 5.1 run smoothly on the proposed 
architecture without generating any alert when there is no attack. In order to more 
thoroughly evaluate the false positive rate of the architecture on real applications, six 
integer applications from SPEC 2000 are run, of which only their binary executables are 
available. These applications are BZIP2, GCC, GZIP, MCF, PARSER and VPR, and the 
default test cases are provided by SPEC 2000. Since none of the test cases is a malicious 
attack, no alert should be generated during the execution of these programs. Table 31 
shows the results of this test: the total size of these programs is 6586KB, the total number 
of input bytes during the execution of the benchmarks is 2186KB, and the total number of 
instructions executed is 15,139 million. During the execution of these programs, not a 
single alert is raised. This experiment is a good indicator that one can expect very few (or 
even no) false positive when the proposed technique is deployed in real systems. 
Table 31: Test False Positive Rate Using SPEC 2000 Benchmark Programs 
 BZIP2 GCC GZIP MCF PARSER VPR Total 
Program size 321KB 4184KB 485KB 304KB 595KB 697KB 6586KB 
Total number of input 
bytes  
1048KB 77.7K 282KB 39.2KB 743.0KB 6.4KB 2186KB 
Total number of 
instructions 
5,951M 110M 6,926M 1,653M 389M 108M 15,139M 
Alert generated? No No No No No No No 
 
6.2.3. False Negative Scenarios 
False negative scenarios of a defensive technique are the situations in which an 
attack escapes detection. Although pointer taintedness architecture detects a larger set of 
memory corruption attacks than existing control-flow integrity based protections, it does 
not provide 100% security coverage. This section shows some synthetic cases where 
certain degree of damage can be done to the system running on top of the proposed 
architecture.  
Integer overflow attacks resulting in an out-of-boundary array index. Integer 
overflow is often due to a programmer’s misinterpretations of signed, unsigned, long and 
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short integers. When a programmer converts integers between these types, the resulting 
values can be inconsistent with the programmer’s expectations. Table 32(A) shows a 
vulnerable function where an unsigned integer ui is assigned to a signed integer i. Lines 2 
and 3 perform an array index boundary check to ensure that i does not exceed the array 
size. This comparison statement untaints i because it has been boundary checked. 
However, an attacker can input a very large unsigned integer ui to the function. When 
ui is assigned to the signed integer i, i becomes negative. Line 4 uses i as the array 
index, allowing the attacker to overwrite any memory address lower than the address of 
array. Neither this technique nor the existing control data protection techniques stop 
integer overflow attacks from corrupting memory. The integer overflow vulnerability 
differs from other memory corruption vulnerabilities because the integer value is 
intended to be the array index, while in other vulnerabilities, the values being 
dereferenced are not supposed to be pointer values: they can be embedded in FTP 
command, HTTP request, and IP address. To defeat the attack, the bound check must be 
implemented correctly. Unfortunately, it is very difficult, if not impossible, on the 
hardware level, to transparently perform the check without knowledge of application 
semantics. 
Buffer overflow attacks corrupting critical flags. Table 32(B) depicts user 
authentication functionality, where a flag auth is defined to indicate whether a user is 
authenticated. After Line 3 sets this flag by calling do_auth(), the buffer overflow 
vulnerability in Line 4 can be exploited to overwrite the authenticated flag to 1. Line 5 
grants access to the user according to the auth flag, and therefore an attacker can get the 
access without successful authentication. The attack cannot be detected by this technique, 
as the attack simply overflows a buffer to corrupt an integer following it, and no pointer 
is tainted during the attack.  
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Table 32: False Negative Scenarios 
(A) Integer overflow causing array 
index out of boundary 
(B) Buffer overflow causing 
critical flags to be corrupted 
(C)Format string attack causing 
information leak  
void foo( 
     unsigned int ui) { 
1:  int i = ui; 
2:  if (i >= ArraySize) 
3:    i = ArraySize – 1; 
4:  array[i] = 1; 
} 
void bar () { 
1:  int auth; 
2:  char buf[100]; 
3:  auth =  do_auth(); 
4:  scanf(“%s”,buf); 
5:  if (auth) 
       grant_access(); 
}  
void leak() { 
1:  int secret_key; 
2:  char buf[12]; 
3:  recv(s,buf,12,0); 
4:  printf(buf); 
} 
Format string attacks causing information leaks. Although this technique prevents 
the attacker from overwriting data through a format string attack, Table 32(C) shows that 
such a vulnerability could allow the attacker to get private information from memory data 
regions such as the stack. Function leak() defines an integer secret_key on the 
stack. A user input buffer buf is passed to printf() as the format argument. It has 
been shown that if the attacker sends abcd%x%x%x%n to the buffer, an alert is raised 
because the %n directive attempts to dereference a tainted pointer. However, if the input 
is %x%x%x%x, the attacker can read the top four words on the stack, including the 
secret_key. Such an information leak attack can be used for future security 
compromises not based on memory corruptions, for example, attacks to steal user 
passwords and secret random seeds. 
Despite these false negative scenarios, the proposed technique substantially 
improves security coverage because (1) most attacks corrupting both control data and 
non-control data can be effectively defeated, (2) the false negative scenarios are in 
general not defeatable by any generic runtime detection technique that we are aware of, 
and (3) the false negative scenarios are rare in the real world. 
Effectively exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities without corrupting any pointer 
is also challenging for attackers, because only a limited number of words following the 
buffer can be overwritten. For stack overflow, the critical flag must be in the same frame 
as the buffer being overrun. For heap overflow, this limit is guarded by the locations of 
the free-chunk links following the buffer. Once the overflowed data exceeds the limit, 
this technique raises an alert because the return address or the links are tainted. The 
technique cannot prevent information leak damage in format string attacks, but their 
severity is expected to be much lower than for memory corruptions.  
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One direction that can potentially reduce the false negative rate is to sacrifice the 
transparency of the proposed taintedness detection architecture. Programmers can be 
asked to annotate important data structures that should never be tainted. The annotated 
data can then be monitored by the architecture. Then, whenever an annotated structure 
becomes tainted, an alert is raised.  
6.2.4.  Architectural Overhead 
Area overhead. The proposed method will incur some area overhead in a 
microprocessor and in the overall memory system. Within the processor, the data path 
between pipeline stages needs to be expanded to accommodate the taintedness bit for 
each byte of data. The internal physical registers, buffers, and other data structures should 
be expanded, as should the data bus between the processor, caches, and physical memory 
banks. Physical memory banks should also increase in width to accommodate the 
taintedness bit. 
Performance overhead. The proposed detection mechanism should not cause 
slowdown or longer cycle time in the pipeline of a modern processor. This is because the 
propagation of the taintedness bits through load, store, and ALU operations are not on the 
critical path of these operations. For example, in executing add r1, r2, r3, the taintedness 
tracking algorithm need only perform a logic OR operation, which can be carried out in 
parallel with the add operation. In fact, the logic OR operation takes less time than the 
add operation to complete, so the taintedness tracking algorithm will not increase clock 
cycle time for the ALU pipeline stage. For load and store operations, the taintedness bit is 
directly copied from source to destination and therefore can be performed at wire speed. 
At the retirement stage, the processor checks whether a memory access (load/store or 
control flow transfer instructions) uses tainted address values, which is a single bit 
operation. Again, the checking is simpler than the normal operations required for 
instruction retirement. Based this analysis, we believe that the operations for the pointer 
taintedness algorithm do not add pipeline stages or increase cycle time.  
Software processing overhead. The operating system kernel requires changes. In 
particular, the kernel should mark data originating from input system calls as tainted. 
This can be done before the operating system passes such data back to user space. If we 
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assume that tainting a byte requires an additional instruction, the percentage of additional 
instructions executed by a SPEC benchmark program is between 0.002% and 0.2% based 
on the data in Table 31. Since the current prototype is based on a processor simulator, the 
discussed operating system enhancement is implemented via system call interception. 
Actual modification of the operating system requires further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 7  
COMBINING STATIC ANALYSIS AND RUNTIME 
DETECTION 
 
7.1. Taking Advantage of Static Analysis and Runtime 
Detection  
The theorem-proving-based static analysis technique and the runtime detection 
technique have both advantages and disadvantages. The static analysis technique does not 
require any physical modification to the processor architecture, but it requires a 
substantial amount of human interventions to perform the theorem-proving task. The 
runtime detection technique is fully automatic, but the modification to the processor, 
especially the taintedness bit extension to the memory system, still imposes a deployment 
difficulty in the near future. This chapter demonstrates a technique combining the static 
analysis and the runtime detection technique. This technique provides a higher degree of 
automation in deriving security specifications, and it relies on runtime checking to 
enforce these specifications. Because the reasoning of pointer taintedness is performed 
statically, there is no need to physically implement the taintedness-aware memory system, 
which can offer an easier deployment on the current architecture. 
7.2. Deriving Security Specifications for Functions 
7.2.1. Flowchart Depicting the Technique 
To provide a higher degree of automation, a verification condition generation 
technique (a.k.a., VC generation) is used, which is essentially a backward reasoning 
process: for each instruction containing a pointer dereference, an initial VC is specified 
stating that “the value of this pointer at this instruction should not be tainted.” Assuming 
the program counter pc is n at this instruction, this VC is denoted as VC(n). The 
functionality of the VC generator is to start with VC(n) to derive VC(n-1), VC(n-2) …. 
VC(0), based on the semantics of instructions in the analyzed function. VC(0) is the 
security specification that needs to be satisfied at the entry of the function in order to 
 90 
ensure VC(n) at instruction n. In other words, since VC(n) states that instruction n does 
not dereference a tainted value, VC(0) is the sufficient condition that eliminates the 
pointer taintedness possibility at instruction n. 
Figure 18 gives a flowchart depicting the process of extracting security 
specifications. First, C source code of the function to be analyzed is compiled to its 
formal semantic representation, which is a simple assembly-like language defined as a 
Maude module. This language is referred to as language L. Based on the program in 
language L, for each pointer dereference in an assignment instruction, the VC generator 
automatically specifies an initial VC stating that the pointer is not tainted. Finally, the VC 
generator gets into an iteration to generate VCs for each instruction. 
C source code of the analyzed function
Assembly code in language L
Compiling
For each pointer dereference in a mov
instruction, generate an initial VC 
stating that the pointer is not tainted
Starting from each initial VC, apply VC 
generation rules to derive VCs backwards, i.e., 
VC(n), VC(n-1)… VC(0), for each instruction
VC(0) is the security specification of 
the analyzed function.
 
Figure 18: Flowchart of Security Specification Extraction 
7.2.2. Language L 
Language L is an assembly-like language, consisting of a few program constructs – 
move instruction, branch instruction, integer, Boolean, dereference operation and ALU 
operations. The difference between Language L and the formal semantic definition 
discussed in CHAPTER 5 is that Language L consists of branch instruction, but no while 
and if instructions. Language L is more suitable for performing VC generation instruction 
by instruction. The semantics of Language L instructions are given in Table 33. 
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Table 33: Language L Instructions 
Instruction Semantics (i.e., VC generation rule) 
inst(n): mov [E1] <- E2 
 Assign the evaluation result of E2 to the memory location 
addressed by the evaluation result of E1. The semantic definition 
similar to the one given in Section 5.2 
inst(n): branch  B  m If Boolean expression B is evaluation to true, jump to instruction m; 
otherwise, continue on instruction n+1. 
VC(n)=(~ B -> VC(n+1)) && (B -> VC(m)) 
inst(n): no-op Null operation 
VC(n)= VC(n+1) 
 
7.2.3. Compiling C Program to L Program 
A compiler was implemented to automatically compile a function written in C to the 
representation of Language L. Table 34 gives the source code of function strcpy() 
and the object code automatically generated by the compiler. The compilation is 
straightforward. For example, C assignment res = dst corresponds to instruction 
inst(1), where res and dst are the memory addresses of variables res and dst in 
C program. The while statement “while (*src!=0)” is translated to inst(2), 
inst(3), inst(7) and inst(8). Semantically, inst(3) means that if double-
dereferencing the address of variable src (i.e., ^ ^ src) yields 0, jump to inst(8). 
The symbol ~ is the “not” operator. C statement “return res” is translated to 
inst(10) and inst(11), where strcpy represents the return value of the function 
strcpy(). 
Table 34: Source Code of strcpy() and Object Code in Language L 
char * strcpy ( 
  char *dst, char *src) { 
    char * res; 
    res =dst; 
    while (*src!=0) { 
      *dst=*src; 
      dst++; 
      src++; 
     } 
    *dst=0; 
    return res; 
}  
inst(1) = mov  [res] <- ^ dst . 
inst(2) = no-op . 
inst(3) =     branch (~(~(^^src is 0))) 8 . 
inst(4) =     mov  [^ dst] <- ^ ^ src . 
inst(5) =     mov  [dst] <- (^ dst) + 1 . 
inst(6) =     mov  [src] <- (^ src) + 1 . 
inst(7) =     branch true 2 . 
inst(8) = no-op. 
inst(9) =  mov  [^ dst] <- 0 . 
inst(10) = mov  [strcpy] <- ^ res . 
inst(11) = branch true 12 . 
inst(12) = no-op . 
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7.2.4. VC Generation 
To eliminate pointer taintedness, it must be ensured that at every indirect write 
instruction, the target address does not contain a tainted value. For example, in function 
strcpy(),at inst(4), ^ dst must not be a tainted value; and at inst(9), ^ dst 
must not be a tainted value. These are formally specified as “VC(4) = 
TAINTEDNESS(^ dst) is false” and  “VC(9) = TAINTEDNESS(^ dst) 
is false”, where TAINTEDNESS(x) is a function to test the taintedness of 
expression x. The VC generator then starts the backward reasoning, which automatically 
extracts the loop invariant. In this case, the loop invariant is trivially “VC(3) = 
TAINTEDNESS(^ dst) is false”. The next section presents two non-trivial 
examples to show the VC generation process.   
7.3. Case Study 
7.3.1. Function Vfprintf() 
Static Extraction of Security Specification. Table 35 gives our implementation of 
Vfprintf(), which is a simplified version of LibC standard function vfprintf(). 
Vfprintf() implements the functionalities of %%, %s, %d, %n format directives. 
The function consists of 57 lines of C statements. The compiler automatically compiles 
Vfprintf() to the object code shown in Table 36. Only two indirect write 
instructions are present in the code. For inst(31), the VC generator specifies “VC(31) 
= TAINTEDNESS(buf + ^n) is false” for inst(31) and “VC(56) = 
TAINTEDNESS(^p) is false” for inst(56). The VC generation process starting 
from VC(31) ends with “VC(27) = true”, indicating that VC(31) always holds no 
matter how Vfprintf() is called. This is because buf is an address constant generated 
by the compiler, which is not a tainted value, and because n is initialized to be 0 and 
incremented by 1, not a tainted value either. Therefore, the VC generation process 
naturally eliminates the possibility of pointer taintedness in inst(31). However, 
VC(56) is not a trivial condition. The VC generator automatically extracts “VC(8) = 
(~ (^ state is 1) && ^ ^ p is 110) -> TAINTEDNESS(^ ap) is 
false”. This suggests that at the entry of the while loop body, if state is not 1 
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(indicating a ‘%’ character being the most recent character in the format string) and *p is 
‘n’ character (110 is the ASCII code of ‘n’), then pointer ap should not be a tainted value. 
This is because Vfprintf() will encounter “%n” and use *ap as a pointer value in 
this iteration. Note that deriving this precise loop invariant VC(8) is a fully automatic 
process. 
Table 35: C Source Code of Vfprintf() 
int Vfprintf (char *s, char *format, 
char * ap) 
{  
  char * p, *q; 
  int done,state,data,n; 
  char buf[10]; 
  p=format; 
  done=0; 
  if (p==0) return 0; 
  state=1; 
  while (*p != 0) { 
    if (state==1) { 
          if (*p==’%’) state=0;   
          else  
                  done++; 
    } 
    else { 
        if (*p==’%’) {     
                done++; 
        } 
        else if (*p==’d’) {    
            data=*ap;   
            if (data<0) { 
                    done++; 
                    data=-data; 
            } 
            n=0; 
            while(data>0 && n< 10 ){ 
              *(&buf+n)=data%10+’0’; 
              data/=10; 
              n++; 
            } 
 
            while (n>0) { 
                   n--; 
                   done++; 
            } 
        }        
        else if (*p==’s’) {    
                q=*ap; 
                if (q==0) break; 
                while (*q!=0) { 
                        done++; 
                        q++; 
                } 
        } 
        else if (*p==’n’) {    
                q = *ap; 
                *(int *)q = done; 
                done++;  
        } 
        else { done++; 
        } 
        state=1; 
    } 
    p++; 
  } 
   return done;   
} 
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Table 36: Object Code of Vfprintf() in Language L 
inst(1) = mov  [p] <- ^ format 
inst(2) = mov  [done] <- 0 
inst(3) =  branch (~(^ p is 0)) 6 
inst(4) =  mov  [Vfprintf] <- 0 
inst(5) =  branch true #return 
inst(6) = no-op 
inst(7) = mov  [state] <- 1 
inst(8) = no-op 
inst(9) =   branch (~(~(^ ^ p is 0))) 66 
inst(10) =    branch (~(^ state is 1)) 18 
inst(11) =     branch (~(^ ^ p is 37)) 14 
inst(12) =     mov  [state] <- 0 
inst(13) =     branch true 16 
inst(14) =     no-op 
inst(15) =     mov  [done] <- (^ done) + 1 
inst(16) =     no-op 
inst(17) =     branch true 63 
inst(18) =     no-op 
inst(19) =     branch (~(^ ^ p is 37)) 22 
inst(20) =      mov  [done] <- (^ done) + 1 
inst(21) =      branch true 61 
inst(22) =     no-op  
inst(23) =     branch (~(^ ^ p is 100)) 42 
inst(24) =      branch (~(^ data < 0)) 27 
inst(25) =      mov  [done] <- (^ done) + 1 
inst(26) =      mov  [data] <- - ^ data 
inst(27) =      no-op 
inst(28) =       mov  [n] <- 0 
inst(29) =       no-op 
inst(30) =       branch (~(0 < ^ data  
&& ^ n < 10)) 35 
inst(31) =      mov  [( buf + ^ n)] <- ( 
(^ data rem 10) + 48) 
inst(32) =      mov  [data] <- ^ data /10 
inst(33) =      mov  [n] <- (^ n) + 1 
 
inst(34) =      branch true 29 
inst(35) =      no-op 
inst(36) =      branch (~(0 < ^ n)) 40 
inst(37) =       mov  [n] <- (^ n) - 1 
inst(38) =       mov  [done] <- (^ done) + 1 
inst(39) =       branch true 35 
inst(40) =      no-op 
inst(41) =      branch true 61 
inst(42) =     no-op 
inst(43) =     branch (~(^ ^ p is 115)) 53 
inst(44) =       mov  [q] <- ^ ^ ap 
inst(45) =       branch (^ q is 0) 40 
inst(46) =       no-op 
inst(47) =       branch (~(~(^ ^q is 0))) 51 
inst(48) =        mov  [done] <- (^done)+ 1 
inst(49) =        mov  [q] <- (^ q) + 1 
inst(50) =        branch true 46 
inst(51) =        no-op 
inst(52) =        branch true 61 
inst(53) =      no-op 
inst(54) =      branch (~(^ ^ p is 110)) 59 
inst(55) =       mov  [q] <- ^ ^ ap 
inst(56) =       mov  [^ q] <- ^ done 
inst(57) =       mov  [done] <- (^ done) + 1 
inst(58) =       branch true 61 
inst(59) =       no-op 
inst(60) =       mov  [done] <- (^ done) + 1 
inst(61) =      no-op 
inst(62) =      mov  [state] <- 1 
inst(63) =  no-op 
inst(64) =     mov  [p] <- (^ p) + 1 
inst(65) =     branch true 8 
inst(66) = no-op 
inst(67) = mov  [Vfprintf] <- ^ done 
inst(68) = branch true 69 
inst(69) = no-op 
 
Runtime Checking the Security Specification. Having the formally extracted security 
specification VC(8), it is straightforward to specify a runtime assertion to enforce it 
(Table 37) Because format string vulnerability is due to pointer taintedness, deploying 
this assertion can defeat format string attacks. 
 95 
Table 37: Vfprintf() with a Runtime Assertion 
int Vfpintf(FILE *s, const char *format, va_list ap) { 
   … 
   while (*p != 0) { 
      assert (!(*p==110 && state != 1 && !UNTAINTED(ap))); 
      //statically extracted specification 
       … 
   } 
} 
int Printf (const char *format,..) 
{   … 
     return Vfprintf (stdout, format, arg); 
} 
void main() { 
 
 Printf("string=%s\ni=%d\n%n",buf,i,&j); 
 
 scanf(“%s”,buf); 
 Printf(buf); 
} 
      
unsigned int stack_top; 
mov %esp, stack_top;  
ADD_UNTAINTED_ADDR (stack_top-4); 
 
 
 
REMOVE_UNTAINTED_ADDR (stack_top-4); 
The assertion requires three basic procedures, which can be implemented by software 
or dedicated hardware. ADD_UNTAINTED_ADDR(p) adds the address p to a set of 
“untainted” addresses, indicating that the content in p is not tainted; 
REMOVE_UNTAINTED_ADDR(p) removes p from the set; UNITATINED(p) is a 
Boolean function checking whether p is in the set or not. The security specification VC(8) 
can be enforced by an assertion “assert (!(*p==110 && state != 1 
&& !UNTAINTED(ap)))”. With this assertion, there is no possibility of pointer 
taintedness in Vfprintf(), and thus no possibility of format string attacks.  
To correctly call the safe version of Vfprintf(), the compiler should insert a pre-
call-stub and a post-call-stub to maintain the set of untainted addresses. In the example, 
because the first Printf() call in main() has a “&j” argument, which is an address 
generated by at compile time. The word “&j” is located in the address stack_top-4, 
so the compiler should add stack_top-4 to the set of untainted addresses before 
calling Printf(). When Printf()returns, the address stack_top-4 needs to be 
removed from the set. 
When the above program is running, the first Printf() behaves as normal. The 
second Printf() behaves as normal for most input buf, but when the user input is an 
attack string, e.g., “%d%d%d%d%d%d%d12345%n”, the program raises an exception, 
which demonstrates the precision of the detection technique. 
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7.3.2. Function Free()  
Heap corruption attacks are due to the taintedness of free-chunk doubly-linked list. 
The tainted pointers are manipulated in function free() of some heap management 
systems. A heap management system is implemented, and the technique is applied on the 
function Free(), which is the deallocation function similar to the standard LibC 
function free(). 
Static Extraction of Security Specification. The source code of Free() (shown in 
Table 38) is compiled to the object code (shown in Table 39), where inst(2), 
inst(24), inst(25), inst(29) and inst(30) are the only indirect write 
instructions. Starting from “VC(2) = TAINTEDNESS(^ FreedBlock +4) is 
false”, the VC generator derives “VC(1) = TAINTEDNESS(^ p) is false”. 
Starting from “VC(24) = TAINTEDNESS (^ (^ BuddyBlock + 8) + 12) 
is false” and “VC(25) = TAINTEDNESS (^ (^ BuddyBlock + 12) + 8) 
is false”, the VC generator derives “VC(1)= (TAINTEDNESS(^ (^ x + 8)) 
is false) &&  (TAINTEDNESS(^ (^ x + 12)) is false)” where x = 
HEAP_BASE + ((^ p) – 16 – HEAP_BASE) xor (^ ((^ p) – 16)). 
Similarly, starting from “VC(29) = TAINTEDNESS(^ FreedBlock +4) is 
false” and “VC(30) = TAINTEDNESS(^ FreedBlock +4) is false”, the 
VC generator derives “VC(1) = TAINTEDNESS(^ p) is false”. Therefore, the 
security specification of function Free() is the conjunction of all these forms of VC(1), 
i.e., “(TAINTEDNESS(^ p) is false) && (TAINTEDNESS(^ (^ x + 8)) 
is false) && (TAINTEDNESS(^ (^ x + 12)) is false)”. The informal 
interpretation of this specification is straightforward – to securely call Free(p), none of 
p, x->Fwd or x->Bak can be tainted, where x is the buddy block of p. 
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Table 38: C Source Code of Free() 
typedef struct _HEAP_BLOCK { 
    int  Size; // The size of the block. 
    int  Busy; // Is this block busy? 
    struct _HEAP_BLOCK * Fwd,* Bak;   
} HEAP_BLOCK, * PHEAP_BLOCK; 
 
char * BlockSizes; 
void Free(char * p) 
{ 
 int        BlockSize,i; 
 char * BuddyBlock,* FreedBlock; 
 int  FreeBlockListIndex, MergeExit; 
 
 FreedBlock=p-sizeof(HEAP_BLOCK); 
 
 // Mark this block free. 
 FreedBlock->Busy=0; 
 BlockSize=FreedBlock->Size; 
     
 FreeBlockListIndex =  
 CalculateFreeBlockListIndex(BlockSize); 
 FreeBlockListIndex=0; 
 while (BlockSize >  
*(BlockSizes+FreeBlockListIndex)) { 
     BlockSize = BlockSize / 2; 
     FreeBlockListIndex++; 
 } 
MergeExit=0; 
     
// see if we can merge the buddy block  
while (FreeBlockListIndex < 6 && MergeExit==0) { 
 BuddyBlock = HEAP_BASE + (FreedBlock –  
              HEAP_BASE) ^ BlockSize; 
 if (BuddyBlock->Busy || BuddyBlock->Size !=  
                         BlockSize)  
     MergeExit=1; 
 else { 
  // Make a bigger block and free it. 
  BlockSize*=2; 
  FreeBlockListIndex++; 
  if (BuddyBlock<FreedBlock)  
             FreedBlock = BuddyBlock; 
  BuddyBlock->Fwd->Bak=BuddyBlock->Bak;  
  BuddyBlock->Bak->Fwd=BuddyBlock->Fwd;  
 } 
} 
    
//Let's insert this freed block to the list. 
FreedBlock->Size = BlockSize;     
FreedBlock->Busy = 0; 
InsertTailList(FreeBlockListIndex, FreedBlock); 
} 
 
Table 39: Object Code of Free() in Language L 
inst(1) = mov  [FreedBlock] <- (^ p - 16) 
inst(2) = mov  [^ FreedBlock + 4] <- 0 
inst(3) = mov  [BlockSize] <- ^ ((^ FreedBlock + 0)) 
inst(4) = mov  [FreeBlockListIndex] <- 0 
inst(5) = no-op 
inst(6) =     branch (~(^ ((^ BlockSizes + ^ FreeBlockListIndex)) < ^ BlockSize))  10 
inst(7) =     mov  [BlockSize] <- (^ BlockSize / 2) 
inst(8) =     mov  [FreeBlockListIndex] <- (^ FreeBlockListIndex) + 1 
inst(9) =     branch true 5 
inst(10) = no-op 
inst(11) = mov  [MergeExit] <- 0 
inst(12) = no-op 
inst(13) =     branch (~(^ FreeBlockListIndex < 6 && ^ MergeExit is 0)) 28 
inst(14) =     mov  [BuddyBlock] <- ((HEAP_BASE + ((((^ FreedBlock - HEAP_BASE)) xor  
                                     ^ BlockSize)))) 
inst(15) =         branch (~(~(^ ((^ BuddyBlock + 4)) is 0) || ~(^ ((^ BuddyBlock + 0)) 
                                                                is ^ BlockSize))) 18.  
inst(16) =         mov  [MergeExit] <- 1 
inst(17) =         branch true 26 
inst(18) =         no-op 
inst(19) =         mov  [BlockSize] <- 2 
inst(20) =         mov  [FreeBlockListIndex] <- (^ FreeBlockListIndex) + 1 
inst(21) =             branch (~(^ BuddyBlock < ^ FreedBlock)) 23 
inst(22) =             mov  [FreedBlock] <- ^ BuddyBlock 
inst(23) =         no-op 
inst(24) =         mov  [^ (^ BuddyBlock + 8) + 12] <- ^ (^ BuddyBlock + 12) 
inst(25) =         mov  [^ (^ BuddyBlock + 12) + 8] <- ^ (^ BuddyBlock + 8) 
inst(26) =     no-op 
inst(27) =     branch true 12 
inst(28) = no-op 
inst(29) = mov  [^ FreedBlock + 0] <- ^ BlockSize 
inst(30) = mov  [^ FreedBlock + 4] <- 0 
inst(31) = no-op 
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Runtime Checking the Security Specification. The formal analysis of the source code 
of Free() clearly suggests the above security specification. A simple runtime assertion 
can be formulated to check this specification in practice. Given a pointer p to be freed, 
calculate p’s buddy block x is calculated. The assertion is “x->Fwd->Bak = x && 
x->Bak->Fwd = x”. For an uncorrupted heap structure, since x is a memory block in a 
doubly-linked list, this assertion should holds, so there is no false positive scenario. In the 
meanwhile, it provides a very effective detection against heap corruption attacks. 
Theoretically, there could be two false negative scenarios in which the attack occurs 
without being detected, but these scenarios are either succeed with negligible probability, 
or they can only overwrite attacker-already-controllable memory locations (i.e., a 
chicken-and-egg situation), and thus have little use to compromise security. Let us 
discuss these scenarios in detail.  
Scenario (1): If the values of x->Fwd->Bak and x->Bak->Fwd can 
be overwritten by the attacker, he/she can bypass our check by specifying x as 
the value. However, the consequence of a heap corruption attack is to overwrite 
the memory locations x->Fwd->Bak and x->Bak->Fwd. If the attacker has 
already possessed the capability of overwriting these two words, there is no 
need for the attack. 
Scenario (2): If the input pointer p is a tainted value, the pointer x 
derived from p is also tainted. With a very small probability, the memory 
locations that the attacker wants to overwrite happen to satisfy the assertion 
“x->Fwd->Bak = x && x->Bak->Fwd = x” (again, note that the 
attacker attempts to overwrite x->Fwd->Bak and x->Bak->Fwd). We 
argue that the coincidence of this small probability with the programming bug 
of freeing a taintable pointer is negligible in reality. 
Table 40 shows a runtime assertion embedded in Free(), which deploys the above 
assertion at the entry of the function. Function main() emulates a heap corruption 
attack. By overwriting the addresses p+60 and p+56, the attack attempts to overwrite 
the function pointer f to p. This attack is detected by the assertion.  
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Table 40: Free() with a Runtime Assertion 
void Free(char * p) 
{  HEAP_BLOCK * x=(HEAP_BLOCK*)  
               (HEAP_BASE + (((p-16) - HEAP_BASE) ^ (*(UINT*)(p-16)))); 
    assert( x->Fwd->Bak== x  && x->Bak->Fwd == x); 
 
    … …(the original source code) 
} 
int main() 
{   char * p; 
    void (*f)(); 
    p = Malloc(40); 
    *(UINT*)(p+60)=(UINT)p; 
    *(UINT*)(p+56)=((UINT)&f)-12; 
    Free(p); 
} 
7.4. Limitations 
The two examples demonstrate that the proposed technique is able to formally derive 
security specifications for non-trivial programs. For these two particular examples, the 
extraction of security specifications is accomplished fully automatically. However, 
specification extraction in general is a very hard task, especially when constructing loop 
invariants (an induction task). Applying automatic formal techniques to analyze program 
properties is a focused topic in formal method and programming language communities. 
The emphasis of this thesis work is primarily on the concept of pointer taintedness, 
rather than the automation of the formal analysis technique. The goal is to show that: (1) 
pointer taintedness is a common root cause of many security vulnerabilities; (2) the 
semantics of pointer taintedness can be formally defined; and (3) reasoning about pointer 
taintedness can extract security specifications, and formal methods can substantially 
assist the reasoning process. 
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Measurement and analysis of security vulnerabilities is crucial for designing secure 
computer systems. This thesis begins with the study of vulnerability reports published in 
Bugtraq list and CERT advisories. An in-depth analysis of vulnerability reports and the 
corresponding source code of the applications suggest three characteristics of security 
vulnerabilities: (1) exploits must pass through a series of elementary activities; (2) 
exploiting a vulnerability involves multiple vulnerable operations on several objects; and 
(3) the vulnerability data and corresponding code inspections allow us to derive a 
predicate for each elementary activity, and a security vulnerability is the result of 
violating the predicate in implementation. These three observations motivate the 
development of the FSM model to depict and reason about security vulnerabilities. Each 
vulnerability is modeled as a series of primitive FSMs (pFSMs), which depicts a derived 
predicate. The proposed FSM methodology is exemplified by analyzing several types of 
vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow and signed integer overflow. The pFSMs are 
classified into three types, indicating three common causes of the modeled vulnerability. 
These causes reflect different aspects of security considerations, and suggest 
opportunities for providing appropriate checks to protect the systems.  
Although most memory corruption attacks and Internet worms employ control-data 
attacks, an in-depth source code analysis of many real-world memory vulnerabilities 
indicates that many types of security-critical non-control data can be corrupted in order to 
compromise security. Our Applicability Claim of Non-Control-Data Attacks states that 
many real-world software applications are susceptible to attacks that do not hijack 
program control flow, and the severity of the resulting security compromises is 
equivalent to that of control-data attacks. To validate the claim, several non-control-data 
attacks are constructed to get the root privilege on real FTP, SSH, Telnet, and HTTP 
servers. Each attack exploits a different type of memory vulnerability, such as stack 
buffer overflow, heap corruption, integer overflow, and format string vulnerability. Based 
on the results of the experiments, it is shown that control flow integrity is not sufficient to 
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provide software security. The general applicability of non-control-data attacks represents 
a realistic threat to be considered seriously in defense research. The analysis shows the 
necessity of further research on defenses against memory corruption based attacks. 
Finding a generic and secure way to defeat memory corruption attacks is still an open 
problem. Despite their general applicability, non-control-data attacks are less 
straightforward to construct than are control-data attacks, because the former require 
semantic knowledge about target applications. Another important constraint is the 
lifetime of security-critical data. Reducing data lifetime is suggested as a secure 
programming practice that increases software resilience to attacks. 
To develop comprehensive defensive techniques to defeat both control-data attacks 
and non-control-data attacks, it is important to extract the common root cause of most 
memory corruption attacks. The analysis in this thesis of various security vulnerabilities 
indicates that such a root cause is pointer taintedness i.e., any programming error causing 
a pointer value to be derived directly or indirectly from user input. By preventing pointer 
taintendess, many attacks can be foiled, inlucding stack smashing (taintedness of a return 
address), heap corruption (taintedness of the doubly-linked list of heap free chunks), 
format string attack (taintedness of an argument pointer) and globbing attack (taintedness 
of a pointer to be freed). Based on the notion of pointer taintedness, this thesis has 
demonstrated two techniques to enhance the security of real-world systems:  
(1) Pointer taintedness avoidance: – uncovering security vulnerabilities by source 
code analysis. To perform source code analysis, first a formal semantic definition of 
pointer taintedness is given, including a taintedness-aware memory model and instruction 
semantics. On top of the semantic definition, a theorem-proving technique is developed 
to analyze C source code at machine code level. For each analyzed function, the theorem 
prover helps to extract a set of security specifications. The satisfaction of these 
specifications guarantees no possibility of pointer taintedness inside this function. This 
technique has been applied to analyze several LibC functions and socket read functions 
of HTTP servers. In each case, the negations of extracted specifications suggest scenarios 
of potential vulnerabilities, and thus the notion of pointer taintedness provides a unifying 
perspective for reasoning about security vulnerabilities. 
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(2) Pointer taintedness detection: checking pointers at runtime. A processor 
architecture level mechanism is proposed to detect pointer taintedness at runtime. Its 
prototype is currently implemented on the SimpleScalar processor simulator. The 
mechanism consists of four major components: taintedness-aware memory model, 
taintedness initialization, taintedness tracking and pointer taintedness detection. Based on 
an extensive evaluation using both synthetic and real-world network applications, and the 
SPEC benchmarks, we conclude the following: (1) the proposed architecture provides a 
substantial improvement in security coverage; (2) a near-zero false positive rate can be 
expected when the architecture is deployed; and (3) despite some synthetic false negative 
scenarios, running programs on the proposed architecture minimizes the chances of a 
successful attack; the incurred architectural overhead is likely to be low; and the 
approach is transparent to existing applications, i.e., applications can run without 
recompilation. 
Future Directions. A unique aspect of this thesis research is its analysis-centric 
approach. A significant amount of effort is on the analysis of real-world security 
vulnerabilities and attacks, which has provided the basis for several new observations and 
ideas. 
Some directions for future work include:  
(1) An analysis of how different programming styles affect susceptibility to security 
attacks.  For example, as seen in CHAPTER 4, the long lifetime of security data is a 
requirement of many security attacks, but in many cases this lifetime can be greatly 
shortened by using a different programming style. It would be interesting to explore 
whether compiler techniques can be used for such program style transformations. 
(2) Although memory vulnerabilities are still primary threats for security, many other 
categories of vulnerabilities are emerging, especially those in HTTP servers and web 
browsers, such as cross-site scripting, cross-domain issues, SQL injection, and URL 
obfuscations. None of them is due to memory corruption vulnerabilities. My preliminary 
investigation about these vulnerabilities suggests that it is promising to apply formal 
semantic analysis to reason about them. A web browser enhanced to detect these 
vulnerabilities would benefit millions of users.  
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(3) To study historical data about how security vulnerabilities were discovered, 
reported, and patched in order to evaluate is the effectiveness of the current patching 
mechanism against real-world attacks, such as viruses, worms, and rootkits (i.e., kernel 
model malcode). An analysis of such data can motivate a more efficient way for applying 
patches in a more secure, more comprehensive, and more timely manner. 
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